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Introduction 
 
 
 In the fall of 2009, the New York Yankees claimed their 27th World Series title 
with a team that oozed capitalism and free markets. With over $200 million committed in 
its annual payroll, the Yankees capitalized on a strong free-agent class and some of the 
best known players in the game to generate their first World Series title since 2000. The 
feat was impressive, but the expectation in New York is always “championship or bust.” 
The following season, the Yankees fell in the American League Championship Series to 
the Texas Rangers who would go on to lose to the San Francisco Giants. The San 
Francisco Giants were not the New York Yankees. They were not even close when it 
came to payroll, star-power, and management. Yet this lovable bunch of losers took 
control of the 2010 post-season and took home their first World Series since moving to 
San Francisco.  
This team was comprised of old and young players, but heavily reliant on its 
young. Riding on the small shoulders of youngsters Tim Lincecum, Matt Cain, and 
rookie Madison Bumgarner, the San Francisco Giants pitched their way into history. 
What should be remembered about this team though is the fact that this team was thought 
to be one of the worst run franchises in the league. While blessed with talented 
youngsters, the San Francisco Giants were weighed down by some of the worst free-
agent contracts in history. Barry Zito, who at the time of his signing, had the most 
expensive contract for a pitcher in baseball history, did not throw a single pitch in the 
post-season. Veteran Aaron Rowand had been offered to teams for practically nothing all 
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season long, but no team would bite due to his inflated $11 million annual salary1. And 
yet, in spite of having nearly a third of the team payroll committed to two insignificant 
players, the San Francisco Giants were able to win a World Series because of their 
talented, money-efficient, young roster.  
 The biggest trend in baseball now lies in the final trait above, youth. But it is a 
stark change in management since the beginning of the past decade. Following the 
success of the New York Yankees at the turn of the century, teams have begun spending 
in greater amounts during free agency, which has resulted in greater investment in aging 
players as a result of the most recent collective bargaining agreement. However, the 
success of these investments is debatable. With bloated contracts such as Barry Zito’s and 
with the success of such young players as Tim Lincecum, baseball appears to be seeing a 
paradigm shift in managerial practices. Furthermore, the latest economic crisis has 
resulted in a greater emphasis on financial responsibility for teams going forward. 
Greater financial responsibility generally has always meant one thing: tighter budgets. 
While this trimming of budgets seems to always be stressed every off-season, the 
numbers seem to indicate otherwise. Free-agent spending has not dropped considerably 
over the course of this decade when analyzing the most expensive contracts of free-
agency.  
 In a brief analysis of free agency from 2006-2009, it was found that out of the 
top-ten richest contracts awarded in each off-season, 17 of the total 40 top-ten contracts 
were handed out by three teams (New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, Chicago Cubs). 
Furthermore, out of the top-twenty players in each free agency class over the four year 
                                                 
1
 "MLB Baseball Roster Analysis." ESPN.com, accessed February 16, 2011, 
http://espn.go.com/mlb/stats/rosters. 
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analysis, 43 players were signed by six teams (New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, 
Chicago Cubs, Philadelphia Phillies, LA Dodgers, and LA Angels) out of the possible 80 
top-twenty players (see Appendix C). This data shows a clear disparity in the amount of 
money spent by teams, and the type of spending habits that exist in baseball today. The 
big market clubs spend the most during free-agency, and the small-market clubs must 
rely on home-grown talent in order to compete.  
 Smaller market clubs are the teams that are expected to rely on in-house talent to 
compete for championships. Because of the favorable conditions of a pre-free agent 
player’s contract, small market teams are able to field a team of competitive talent for a 
very affordable price. However, these teams almost always lose these young players as a 
result of free-agency and their inability to compete with the money offered by the above-
mentioned big market organizations. With no salary cap to ensure a financial balance, 
baseball exhibits a true free-market where money can be spent at any one team’s 
discretion. While these smaller market clubs seem to be doomed to failure, several teams 
have managed to be successful and competitive by managing their young talent 
creatively. The most popular method for frugal teams to reach success is throughout 
trades. By trading away talented pre-free-agent players, small market clubs are able to 
acquire multiple players that can add depth to their organization. In example, the Oakland 
Athletics organization has been known for this practice. Following the 2005 baseball 
season, the Oakland A’s had three premier pitchers not one of which had reached his 
free-agency eligibility. With the team already having lost their most talented hitters to 
free-agency, management opted to trade away two of their three star pitchers in order to 
acquire several players who would help them compete again in the future. Specifically, 
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the team traded away two pitchers in separate transactions that netted them eight 
prospects for the future. Such practices are commonly seen every year as players that are 
near their free-agency period (typically at the end of that season or the next season) are 
dealt for multiple prospects.  
 This endless cycle of rebuilding has yielded mixed results. Some teams, such as 
the Oakland Athletics, have produced winning results. Other teams, including the 
Pittsburgh Pirates, have remained in the lower echelon of the league. But of course, 
baseball, like all sports is not just about winning: it is also about making money. Not 
surprisingly, the big-market clubs are valued higher than small-market clubs in financial 
value. The New York Yankees are valued at over $1 billion dollars thanks to not only 
their $200+ million annual player payroll,2 but also because of their expensive stadium, 
personal TV network, and merchandise/brand value. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that the Yankees or any big-market club is highly profitable. With such high 
operating costs, profit margins may not necessarily be what they appear to be. Therefore, 
it may be possible that the most profitable teams are teams that rely on youth or perhaps 
even a balance of youth and experience, at a reasonable price.  
 Management makes all of these actions happen. Every player that is signed to a 
contract is reviewed by management. However, we see two prevailing styles of 
management in existence today. On the one hand there are aggressive managers such as 
the Yankees’ Brian Cashman. Year after year, the Yankees are the top players for the top 
free-agents and top trade targets, but they are rarely recognized for developing young 
prospects into successful players. Since the start of the past decade, the Yankees have 
                                                 
2
 "2011 MLB Salaries by Team - USATODAY.com." USATODAY.com, accessed March, 31, 2011, 
http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/baseball/mlb/salaries/team. 
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brought up only one All-Star throughout their organization (Robinson Cano). During the 
same decade the Yankees produced the most All-Stars, but only Cano was brought up 
throughout the organization over the course of the decade. At the moment, it seems that 
he may be the only one for several years since the Yankee pipeline has not shown 
promising signs of new prospects. Instead, the Yankees have invested their time and 
resources in acquiring talent that can make an impact on the following season as 
evidenced by the fact that Yankees have paid for four of the five most expensive 
baseball/sports contracts ever, all within the last decade. The Yankees are the extreme of 
the “win-now” mentality, but there are several other teams that exhibit aggressive 
transaction tactics.  
 The other side of the coin exists with small market teams who rely on building 
teams in windows. These windows exist as short time-spans of a few seasons in which 
the prospects of an organization are expected to peak together and allow the team to 
perform at an elite level. However, these windows eventually close because of free-
agency where these players will depart for more lucrative markets. The Tampa Bay Rays 
are the most recent example of this window mentality. For the entire history of the Tampa 
Bay Devil Rays/Rays organization, the team existed in the bottom echelon of the league. 
However, in 2008, the team went from worst to first, making their first franchise playoff 
appearance and eventually a World Series appearance. The team repeated its success in 
2009 and 2010, posting winning records and achieving another post-season appearance in 
2010. However, the team is already reaching a point of decline. All-star Carl Crawford 
departed this off-season, and, over the past two seasons, the team has lost 6 different all-
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star players and core pieces contributing to their success.3 Furthermore, the simple truth 
is that the team’s modest payroll of $42 million for 2011 will have prevented the team 
from making any significant transactions to improve their team over the off-season. But 
hope is not lost with the Tampa Bay Rays. Currently the Rays are ranked second in Keith 
Law’s organizational rankings with eight prospects ranked among the top 100,4 and the 
Rays are slated to have ten of the first sixty picks in the 2011 amateur draft,5 which 
signals that the team will acquire even more talent. With such a great deal of talent, it is 
not out of the question to see the Rays back in competition for a World Series in four to 
five years.  
 The Tampa Bay Rays are expected to take a fall in the rankings this year, but no 
one doubts that this team will return to prominence. The Yankees are expected to 
compete once again for their 28th World Series title this season. The argument is that the 
aggressive actions of big-market teams are always to win now, but how successful is this 
strategy? Looking at the past decade of baseball, the Yankees have owned the most 
expensive payroll for every year of the decade, which has yielded nine post-season 
appearances and one World Series title. While one World Series has been perceived by 
the media as a failure, post-season success is much less predictable than the regular 
season. But the Yankees may be more of an exception than it seems. The New York Mets 
possessed a comparable payroll to Yankees for much of the decade, but the team has only 
appeared in the post-season and World Series once during the decade. The Chicago Cubs, 
                                                 
3
 "MLB Baseball Roster Analysis." 
4
 Keith Law, February 28, 2011,"First MLB organizational rankings for 2011 have Kansas City Royals 
predictably on top" http://insider.espn.go.com/mlb/insider/news/story?page=2011MLBOrgRanks. 
5
 Bay News 9, April 14, 2011, "MLB set 2011 draft order and the Rays will be busy on day one,” Bay 
News 9 . http://www.baynews9.com/article/sports/2011/april/232893/MLB-set-2011-draft-order-and-the-
Rays-will-be-busy-on-day-one. 
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White Sox, and Seattle Mariners have also consistently ranked as teams with expensive 
payrolls, but, between the three clubs, only five post-season appearances have been made, 
with only one World Series title. Money clearly has not equated success for these clubs, 
especially with teams like the Oakland Athletics and Minnesota Twins appearing in more 
post-seasons (eight) than the Mets, Cubs, and White Sox combined, and with both teams 
showing payrolls averaging below $60 million each for the past decade.6  
` Today, top prospects are guarded with the most protection possible. In 2009, the 
Philadelphia Phillies attempted to make a trade for All-Star pitcher, Roy Halladay from 
the Toronto Blue Jays. The deal was ultimately unsuccessful because the Phillies refused 
to part with their top pitching prospect, Kyle Drabek.7 Instead, the Phillies traded for 
another All-Star pitcher, Cliff Lee, which did not require trading Kyle Drabek. While Lee 
ended being a very successful addition to the Phillies in 2009, Roy Halladay was 
considered to be the true prize of the trade market, and a favorite of the Phillies. 
However, the Phillies felt that trading a prospect with no known track record of success at 
the major league level was unreasonable, even if the prize was perennial All-Star and Cy 
Young award contender. The New York Mets also refused to make a trade for Roy 
Halladay by the same wisdom, with one Mets official being quoted saying the team was 
trying to avoid, “mortgaging our future.”8 The Mets had clearly shifted their mentality 
from just 18 months earlier when the team had traded away four prospects for similarly 
touted All-Star Johan Santana from the Minnesota Twins.  
                                                 
6
 ESPN. "MLB Baseball Free Agent Tracker ," ESPN.com, http://espn.go.com/mlb/freeagents (accessed 
February 28, 2011). 
7
 Jon Heyman, "Phillies won't trade Kyle Drabek for Roy Halladay; Cliff Lee news." SI.com, July 21, 2009, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/jon_heyman/07/21/daily.scoop/index.html. 
8
 Heyman, “Phillies won’t trade Kyle Drabek for Roy Halladay; Cliff Lee news.”  
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 Such decisions seem controversial. But the fact is that winning teams are built 
around a foundation of talented young players. The San Francisco Giants pitched their 
way to the 2010 World Series because of a highly talented pitching staff that stayed with 
the organization from their drafting to the World Series. Even the Giants’ offense was 
anchored by a young, home-grown player, rookie Buster Posey. Posey was called up mid-
season and was the heart of the Giants offense from his debut. The Tampa Bay Rays and 
Texas Rangers both made the postseason with two of the youngest teams in the league, 
with an average age of 27.7 for both teams.9 Both teams were anchored by young, 
talented players who were expected to carry the team in place of long-time veterans. As 
the Rays exhibited though, such success takes time and patience.  
The league even seems to support this belief as Major League Baseball is the only 
sport of American sports where teams cannot trade draft picks, and its draft has more than 
three times the number of rounds than all other American sports drafts combined. It is 
also the only sport where teams are compensated for the loss of players with draft picks. 
But this plethora of young talent is also encouraged by the league because of the 
incredible disparity of wealth allowed between teams. It is not surprising to see that the 
youngest teams also have the smallest payrolls. While conventional wisdom has told us 
that it is unlikely that these low-paying, young teams can compete with the behemoths of 
the large baseball markets, these teams compete every year for a trip to the postseason.  
On the opposite side, the big-market teams are expected to compete year-in and 
year-out, but we have seen large market teams like the Chicago Cubs not just fail once, 
but almost yearly to make the postseason. Furthermore, the game of baseball is shifting 
                                                 
9
 Data provided by, www.baseball-reference.com 
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toward a more athletic game. It is a known fact that players lose reaction speed as they 
age, which is directly related to bat speed. But the game of baseball is also shifting 
toward a greater defensive focus, perhaps even to an unhealthy level.10 The “hot” stat of 
the past few years has been UZR (Ultimate Zone Rating), which measures the skills 
required for a player’s position and his total amount of area covered by his own personal 
athleticism. The measurement of a player’s “zone” heavily favors younger players, as 
older players tend to become slower with age.  
All of the above seems to support the fact that younger players are becoming the 
most valuable players in Major League Baseball. Free agency itself is recognized to be a 
gamble, and, with the majority of top free-agents going to financial powerhouses, it is 
even less likely that a star player can be acquired outside of an organization. Even the 
New York Yankees have begun protecting their favorite youngsters, with their refusal to 
trade prized youngsters Joba Chamberlain, Phil Hughes, and Jesus Montero. If the 
Yankees believe it, then it is clear that the youth movement is here to stay.  
 This thesis is geared specifically toward investigating the valuing/over-valuing of 
young players in baseball, and its effect on the game of baseball. Considering the 
numerous variables that are debated toward the success of a baseball organization, it 
seems necessary to try to discover the importance of these various factors toward the 
success of an organization. In total, this thesis will analyze several covariates that are 
currently disputed in their importance toward the success of a Major League Baseball 
franchise, including youth. The analysis will incorporate both qualitative and quantitative 
characteristics, and this thesis will look at their impact on an organization’s success both 
                                                 
10
 Tim Marchman, "Did Red Sox, Mariners, White Sox go too far with defense?” May 13, 2010, SI.com, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/tim_marchman/05/13/run.prevention/index.html.  
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on the baseball field and in financial profits. This thesis will also look into the origination 
of the overvaluing of youth in baseball, and the causes of this overwhelming trend 
throughout the baseball world. Finally, this thesis will also analyze select organizations 
on a case-study basis. The purpose of each analysis will be to provide examples of the 
specific conditions that have coincided with the covariates under analysis, as well as 
exceptions and failures to the trends under analysis.   
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Chapter 1: History of the Youth Movement 
 
Steroids and Performance Enhancing Drugs 
 Following the 1995 strike season in baseball, the game struggled to return to its 
previous prominence. Attendance lagged and the game lost its appeal.11 This all changed 
in 1998 as baseball began its ascension to prominence on the backs of two big-time 
sluggers: Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa. McGwire, who had slugged 58 homeruns the 
prior season, began the season on a monstrous tear: 27 homeruns in the season’s first two 
months. From the start of the season, McGwire seemed poised to break the single-season 
home-run record. However, competition for the precious record emerged in June of 1998 
when the relatively unknown Sammy Sosa slugged 20 homeruns in a single month to put 
himself just behind Mark McGwire. The two continued their bout up until the season’s 
end, when both broke Roger Maris’ single-season homerun record: Sosa finishing with 
66 and McGwire with 70. The great homerun chase brought a new wave of interest and 
excitement to baseball that had not been seen since before the strike. The two athletes 
served as the new poster-boys of baseball.   
 The two new heroes also ended up becoming the poster-boys for a new era of 
baseball: the Performance Enhancing Drug Era. During a post-game interview it was 
discovered that Mark McGwire had been using androstenedione, a relatively unknown 
drug at the time. “Andro” (as it is commonly known) eventually became not only an 
illegal substance in baseball, but an illegal substance in the United States. The 
supplement is chemically a step short of testosterone and is easily converted to 
                                                 
11
 Mark Maske, "After the Strike, Baseball's Disgusted Fans Decide to Strike Back ." The Washington Post, 
April 30, 1995. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-837033.html. 
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testosterone when ingested. Andro was immediately identified by the media as a banned 
supplement by stricter athletic-ruling bodies: the NCAA and the Olympics. But when 
asked about the supplement, McGwire replied that “Everybody that I know in the game 
uses the same stuff I do.”12 McGwire’s claim brought greater attention to steroids, which 
would eventually come to haunt the game of baseball for the next decade.  
 Following Mark McGwire’s epic home-run season, a new era of power-hitting 
seemed to emerge. From 1998-2005, an individual player has hit 50+ homeruns in a 
season 14 times; the total number of 50+ homerun seasons in baseball history is 42.13 
While McGwire may have been the beginning of the “Steroid Era,” he would ultimately 
not become the face of the era. This honor belongs to Barry Bonds.  
For much of his career Barry Bonds was considered by many to have been the 
greatest player of his time. Bonds was the complete package on the field: he could hit for 
average, power, steal bases, and play defense. But Bonds seemed to be hidden from the 
spotlight despite all of his achievements. This changed during the 2001 baseball season. 
Barry Bonds slugged 73 homeruns in 2001, and would later go on to 762 career 
homeruns, which made him the single-season and career home-run king of baseball. But 
such achievements were not without controversy. Bonds’ feats seemed supernatural. His 
73 homerun season came at the age of 37; after turning 35 years-old, Barry Bonds hit 317 
home-runs. 317 home-runs in 8 seasons accounted for 42% of Barry Bonds’ career home-
run total over his 22 seasons. While power-spikes are common, it was unheard of to see a 
man at the back-end of his career hitting for such power. This abnormality did not go 
                                                 
12
 ESPN, "Who Knew?." ESPN.com. http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?page=steroids&num=8. 
13
 "Baseball-Reference.com - Major League Baseball Statistics and History." www.baseball- 
reference.com. 
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unnoticed. Despite his achievements, controversy and questioning followed Bonds 
throughout the rest of his career. The evidence was claimed to have been everywhere. 
Bonds’ physique had transformed in his later years as he had: his hair fell out, head size 
increased, developed a great deal of acne, and had developed testicular abnormalities 
according to the testimony of his mistress, Kristen Bell in his recent perjury trial.14 
With the media discounting the many accomplishments of Barry Bonds, the fans 
of baseball began screaming for drug-testing to ensure the purity of the sport. After 
negotiating with the players union, Major League Baseball announced an experimental 
testing phase in baseball. No results would be released from the test. Instead, the testing 
was meant to indicate how many players in baseball would test positive for banned 
substances (as indicated by other governing sports bodies) during the 2003 season. If 
more than 5% of players tested positive, mandatory testing with punitive action would be 
instituted. The names of players were to remain anonymous during this phase of testing. 
The results indicated that between 5-7% of players tested positive for banned substances. 
The first drug policy instituted was considered by many critics to be too light. The United 
States Senate Commerce Committee eventually urged Major League Baseball to institute 
a stricter punishment system than what it had in place. The resulting policy indicated 50-
game, 100-game, and lifetime suspensions for subsequent testing failures. The new 
policy, which is still in practice today came into place for the 2006 Major League 
Baseball season.15  
                                                 
14
 Associated Press, March 29, 2011, "Barry Bonds trial: Ex-mistress says slugger blamed injury on 
steroids." ESPN.com. http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=6266163. 
15
 "Drug Policy coverage." MLB.com. http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/news/drug_policy.jsp?content=timeline. 
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 Perhaps one of the greatest blows to the sport of baseball came in the infamous 
Mitchell Report, which provided detailed histories of players who had used steroids in the 
game of baseball. The report implicated several top players, and it provided the public 
with the great depth of knowledge on the positive and negative effects of steroids within 
the game of baseball. The findings of the report were not particularly shocking, but the 
fact that the government had become so involved in the report indicated that changes and 
transparency would be needed for baseball to move forward.  
 While steroids have gotten the most attention from the media, perhaps the most 
important drug to be investigated in Major League Baseball, and which may be the real 
source of the new youth movement, is amphetamines. Amphetamines have been rumored 
to be in existence in baseball since the 1940s, perhaps earlier. But it is these “greenies” 
that may actually be the source of baseball’s latest trend toward youth. The use of 
amphetamines is well known. One can even argue that amphetamines are the reason that 
WWII was won by the Allies, as pilots were heavily reliant on amphetamines to keep 
them awake throughout long missions. Amphetamines are known to have similar effects 
to cocaine. The physiological effects of amphetamines include: wakefulness, alertness, 
decreased sense of fatigue, elevated of mood and confidence, and decreased appetite.16 
Because of these known benefits, it is obvious that amphetamines are extremely 
beneficial to a player during the course of a 162-game, six-month season. However, one 
of the commonly unknown benefits and pitfalls of amphetamines is its ability to distort its 
user’s perception of reality, as well as harming the user’s physical condition. This allows 
                                                 
16
 "Drugs and Sports: Amphetamines." ESPN.com, accessed January 21, 2011, 
http://espn.go.com/special/s/drugsandsports/amphet.html. 
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players to push their bodies throughout injury, which can be both beneficial and harmful. 
Amphetamines stay within the user’s system for a longer period of time than cocaine.  
 The main purpose and benefit of amphetamines in baseball is to aid players 
throughout the grind of a 162-game season. Amphetamines provide its users with 
sustained levels of focus and mental alertness. In a Sports Illustrated cover story, former 
National League MVP Ken Caminiti provided a detailed outline of his use of steroids and 
performance enhancing drugs throughout his career. With regards to amphetamines, 
Caminiti spoke about their ability to get him energized for a game after a heavy night of 
drinking saying, “"You take some pills, go out and run in the outfield, and you get the 
blood flowing,"17 Current Texas Rangers Manager, Ron Washington, has also admitted to 
using amphetamines during his career saying that, "Amphetamines were prevalent 
throughout baseball."18 These benefits obviously seem to make a great deal of sense for 
players who are beginning to show the signs of aging and are unable to recover quickly 
from the previous day.  
 Because of their long history in baseball, the use of amphetamines has largely 
been overlooked. This has changed with the latest drug testing policy instituted by major 
league baseball for the 2006 season. Amphetamines now fall under the list of banned 
substances. However, the punitive measures do not match the harshness of anabolic 
steroids. Under the current performance enhancing drugs policy, players are put under 
                                                 
17
 Tom Verducci, "Getting Amped." Sports Illustrated, June 3, 2002, accessed November 19, 2010, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1025905/index.htm.  
18
 ESPN, "Texas Rangers' Ron Washington said he used amphetamines and marijuana during his playing 
days," accessed April 20, 2011, ESPN.com. http://sports.espn.go.com/dallas/mlb/news/story?id=5006406.  
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investigation and expansive testing when testing positive for amphetamines.19 The 
banning of amphetamines should be noted as an area of great importance when 
evaluating the numbers of the post-steroid era in baseball especially when considering the 
numbers of players past the age of 30. Currently, the numbers of players past their 30s 
seem to be in decline.  
 
The Effects of Drug Testing 
 
 Since baseball began drug testing the effects have been noticeable. Hitter statistics 
have changed significantly since the institution of drug testing. More specifically, power 
numbers have changed. From 1995 to 2005, the “peak” of the steroids era, Major League 
Baseball had 40 players average a slugging percentage over .500.2021 Following the 
institution of a formal drug policy, Major League Baseball saw that number drop to 31.22 
It also possible that this number could continue to drop over the next ten years as more 
data is collected. Furthermore, the total number of homeruns hit per season by the entire 
league dropped. Beginning in 1995 baseball homeruns increased steadily from around 
4,000 per a season to nearly 6,000. The average homerun total per season from 1995-
2005 was 5,106 homeruns. Since 2006, though, homerun production has dropped to 
                                                 
19
 Jake Emen, "Amphetamines: The True Culprit in Baseball," Associated Content, accessed October 6, 
2010, 
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/319191/amphetamines_the_true_culprit_in_baseball.html?cat=71 
20
 Data obtained from www.fangraphs.com  
21
 Slugging percentage is a popular statistic used to measure the power hitting abilities of a player 
22
 www.fangraphs.com 
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4,901. 23 While such drops may be coincidental, it is worth noting that such changes are 
falling in line with steroid policies.  
 While power numbers have declined, it should also be noted that the overall 
performance is also on the decline across the board in baseball. Looking at the best 
players (as determined by Wins Above Replacement) in MLB throughout the first-half of 
the past decade, when performance enhancing drugs were permitted, compared to the 
second-half, when performance enhancing drugs were banned, the number of players in 
the top 25 that were over the age of 30 were eight from 2001-2005 compared to five in 
2006-2010. Of the five in 2006-2010, all five were listed in the previous half of the 
decade.24 These signs indicate that there were no players over the age of 30 who emerged 
to be among the best players in the league. Rather all players that were among the best in 
the league over the age of 30 had already been established successful players. In 
comparison, compared to the previous half decade (1996-2000), only two players 
repeated as top performers in MLB past the age of 30. Of the eight players over the age 
of 30 who performed the best from 2001-2005, the peak of the steroid era, only two of 
those players had previously been among the best during the previous decade. This 
evidence obviously cannot show that performance enhancing drugs were the direct cause 
of such results, but it does show how rare it is for a player over the age of 30 to appear at 
the top of the game without previously been labeled as one of the sport’s premier players.  
 In this post-steroid era, the ability to perform successfully at an elite level over the 
age of 30 is incredibly rare. In the past baseball season alone there were very few elite, 
single-season achievements accomplished by older players. In fact, the ability of any 
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player to achieve into his late 30s is considered to be nearly impossible. Consider that 
over the past decade only two players over 35 to: hit 25 homeruns, drive in 100 RBIs, 
maintain a season slugging percentage over .500, an on-base percentage over .400, and 
make at least 400 plate appearances (roughly 125 games) are Barry Bonds and Manny 
Ramirez.25 Of course, the two players have steroids and performance enhancing drugs 
attached to their names, and their remarkable success seems to be just that: too 
remarkable. On the other side of the diamond, pitchers have not fared any better. Within 
the same age bracket, no pitcher over the age of 30 in the last decade has won 15 games 
and had an ERA below 3.50. One pitcher has won 15 games (Derek Lowe), and one has 
sustained an ERA below 3.50 (Andy Pettite).26 The late 30s are greatly feared in the post 
steroid-era, but being on the hook for a contract into the late 30’s is even scarier.  
With the banning of amphetamines, the expectation is that the performance of 
older players will decline, which has been the case for the most part. However, 
amphetamines are still in use in baseball, and it is a known fact to the public. Under the 
new drug policy, there are exceptions to players who need medication that may break the 
rules of the latest drug policy. The most notable exception has been in amphetamines 
used to combat attention deficit disorder (ADD). Before amphetamines were banned in 
baseball, only 28 players had filed for therapeutic exemptions. In 2010, 108 requests were 
filed with Major League Baseball. All requests are made for exemptions from 
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amphetamines to combat ADD.27 Furthermore, during the 2009 season 15 players tested 
positive for stimulants. Of these 15, 13 tested positive for Adderall.28 
The current estimate of the population that has been diagnosed with ADD varies 
between 3-5%. 108 exemption claims places the baseball ADD population at almost 10% 
of Major League Baseball.29 Such a discrepancy seems to be pointing toward abuse, and 
it has been asked that the league further investigates the matter. However, such numbers 
also show that amphetamines are considered to be a very important factor for many 
players across the league.  
 
A History of Free-Agency 
 The Major League Baseball Players Association has been a tremendous force for 
the players. The original collective bargaining agreement made in 1968 raised minimum 
player salaries from $6,000 to $10,000 and provided players with the right to arbitration 
to settle grievances. Since then, the MLBPA has re-negotiated the CBA several times, but 
the most significant contribution of the MLBPA has been its role in developing free 
agency.  
 The reserve clause of Major League Baseball allowed teams to reserve the rights 
to a player for year after his original contract expired. This was created initially to 
prevent sheer capitalism from taking over the game and allowing the wealthiest teams to 
purchase the best players. However, the reality of this clause was that it took away any 
bargaining power from players. Players were left with two options at the end of their 
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contract: either ask to be released from their contracts (which rarely occurred) or to hold 
out until after their contract was completed and forfeit a year’s pay in the process.  
 Federal Baseball Club v. National League (259 U.S. 200 (1922)) was brought to 
the Supreme Court to try and overturn the reserve clause. However, the Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of baseball. The Court stated that baseball was exempt from interstate 
commerce because the game crossed state lines by mere incident, rather than 
purposefully. Baseball would remain exempt from antitrust legislation for the next 55 
years until the “Seitz decision” was passed, which effectively ended the reserve clause.30  
 While the “Seitz decision” brought the rise of the current free agency system, the 
beginnings of such a movement originated with the Curt Flood. Flood was a standout 
baseball player during his prime both defensively and offensively. During his career he 
earned seven gold glove awards, batted over .300 six times, and helped his team win two 
World Series titles as a member of the St. Louis Cardinals.31 After the 1969 baseball 
season, Flood learned from a reporter that, without his knowledge, he was bring traded to 
the Philadelphia Phillies, a terrible team at the time. Flood refused to accept the deal, and 
wrote a letter to baseball commissioner at the time, Bowie Kuhn, asking to be declared a 
free agent, which would have undermined the reserve clause. Kuhn rejected the request, 
and Flood sued.  
 The case of Flood vs. Kuhn went to the Supreme Court where the court ultimately 
ruled, once again, in favor of baseball. The Court acknowledged that baseball was indeed 
interstate commerce unlike its Federal Baseball Club decision, but it still ruled against 
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Flood and declared the case not a violation of anti-trust laws. And the Court urged 
Congress to produce appropriate legislation. While Flood did not win the case, the 
attention that the case caused would ultimately lead to the overturning of the reserve 
clause. With the Supreme Court showing it would not rule in favor of the players, more 
players and the general public became aware of the clause and more efforts were done to 
try and overturn it. Following the National Labor Relations Board adoption of baseball to 
be under its jurisdiction, the Seitz Decision was made. Andy Messersmith and Dave 
McNally overturned the clause after both players played throughout their option year in 
1975. Because both players had fulfilled their contracts, including the one-year reserve 
clause stipulation, arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled that the two were free agents and able to 
sign wherever they pleased. The following year, Major League Baseball adopted a new 
agreement with the Major League Baseball Players Association that allowed players with 
six years experience to become free agents.32  
 
Free Agency Today 
The results of the Curt Flood case and the “Seitz decision” live on today. Today 
free agency has become one of the most exciting aspects of the baseball season. And it 
occurs after the season has ended. For many teams, a player’s year prior to free agency is 
a difficult time. Teams are often faced with choosing either to lose the player at the end 
of the season, or to trade the player before the season ends to be able to get something in 
return. This is especially true for many small market franchises. The league has tried to 
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counteract these difficult situations by setting up a system that compensates teams for the 
loss of high-end talent to big-market clubs.  
 The current system of free agency compensation relies on using the amateur draft 
to compensate teams. Currently there are three types of free agents: Type A, B, and C. 
Type A free agents require the signing team to surrender its first round pick to the losing 
team. Additionally, the losing team will receive a sandwich pick between the first and 
second rounds of the amateur draft. However, if the team that signs the type A free agent 
is drafting in the top half of the next season’s draft, they are exempt from giving up their 
first round pick and instead must surrender their second-round pick. Type A free agents 
are categorized as a player that falls into the top twenty percent of his position. Type B 
free agents are in the next top twenty percent of their position. Signing teams do not have 
to surrender a pick, but losing teams still receive a sandwich pick between rounds. Type 
C free agents fall anywhere after type A and B free agents, and type C free-agents do not 
require any compensation to the losing team.33 
 
Recent Bad Contracts 
It is worth noting that the worst contracts have signed during this time of great 
inefficiency and lack of fiscal responsibility in baseball. Over the past decade 23 contacts 
have been signed that have totaled over $100 million and six-years in length. Of those 23, 
13 have been completed or in existence for over four seasons, which allows better 
analysis. Of those thirteen, seven contracts have been shown to have at least as many 
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productive years as unproductive years (see below).34 
Player Years Productive seasons
Alex Rodriguez 2001-2008 8 of 8
Manny Ramirez 2001-2008 8 of 8
Albert Pujols 2004-2010 7 of 7
Todd Helton 2003-2010 5 of 8
Jason Giambi 2002-2008 5 of 8
Derek Jeter 2001-2010 5 of 10
Carlos Beltran 2005-2010 3 of 6
Derek Lee 2007-2010 2 of 4
Kevin Brown 1999-2005 3 of 7
Ken Griffey Jr. 2000-2008 2 of 9
Mike Hampton 2001-2008 0 of 8
Alfonso Soriano 2007-2010 0 of 4
Barry Zito 2007-2010 0 of 4
  
Only three players have played out such contracts to 100% productivity: Alex Rodriguez 
(2001-2008), Manny Ramirez (2001-2008), and Albert Pujols (2004-2010). [Productive 
season = 400+ plate appearances, OPS+ of 125+, OR 20+ games started, and ERA+ 
125].35 Of all players in 50% or higher productivity range, not a single player is a pitcher. 
In fact of the three pitchers who fit the sample size, only Kevin Brown has ever produced 
a productive season. 
Of the three above mentioned players Rodriguez and Pujols have been the most 
productive, and both have ranked as the most valuable players in the league over the last 
decade (based on Wins Above Replacement rankings). Ramirez has been productive as 
well, but production has fallen off significantly for Ramirez since 2004, when he turned 
32 years-old. Rodriguez and Pujols signed their large contracts at young ages (Rodriguez: 
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Figure 1 – Mega Contracts of the Decade 
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25, Pujols: 24), and they have been able to not only be productive throughout their 
contracts, but also benefit from being able to sign at least two major contracts in their 
careers: once during their twenties and once more during their early 30s, which is still 
within the typical peak range of players allowing them to demand contracts well over 
$200 million.36  
 As mentioned previously, any player playing beyond the age of 35 should not be 
expected to perform at an elite level. However, most players in MLB reach free agency at 
ages ranging from 28-32. All players seek not only big annual contracts, but they also 
seek long contracts with guaranteed incentives.  In spite of the facts that players’ 
performance diminishes with age, teams continue to be generous towards the elderly. 
Assistant GM of the Red Sox, Ben Cherington stated, “You’re basically paying a tariff at 
the back end to get significant production in the early years.”37 While prime production 
may be valuable, the price of paying for the back ends of these mega-contracts seems to 
outweigh the benefits. As players continue to decline with so much money owed to them, 
they become unusable assets. Most importantly, they become undesirable for the team 
that owns their contract, and they become undesirable for any other team.  
 Of the contracts listed, only four players have been traded under their contracts. 
Alex Rodriguez and Kevin Brown were traded to the Yankees, who were largely able to 
make such trades because of their seemingly limitless budget, which was used to take on 
the remaining amount of Rodriguez’s and Brown’s contracts. Manny Ramirez was traded 
in the final year of his contract at the trade deadline, and he was traded at a time when he 
was worth very little to most organizations due to his lack of effort for the Red Sox in his 
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final days with the team. Mike Hampton was traded to the Atlanta Braves after two years 
of poor performance with the Colorado Rockies. The move was largely made for 
financial reasons as the Rockies were struggling as a franchise, and the trade could not 
have been made without the Florida Marlins being a mediator and paying for $30 million 
of Hampton’s remaining $90 million left on his contract. Such negotiations are rare, and 
difficult to pull off unless they involve the New York Yankees. This list may grow in the 
coming year as Carlos Beltran, Albert Pujols, and Todd Helton all enter their final years 
of their massive contracts, but if they are traded it will have to be in exchange for less 
than the contract is worth or with the ability to negotiate an extension with the player 
before making the deal. However, Helton and Beltran have all seen tremendous declines 
since signing their contracts, and likely will only be traded to a desperate contending 
team, if at all.  
 Such contracts prevent teams from unloading these players, but they also play a 
huge role in the ability of teams to upgrade their rosters throughout free agency. The 
Houston Astros have been unable to upgrade their roster since their initial commitment to 
Carlos Lee. Since signing Carlos Lee to his deal before the 2007 season, the Astros have 
not made the post-season and have not signed a major free agent. Similarly, the St. Louis 
Cardinals currently have been unable to re-sign Albert Pujols before his self-instituted 
deadline, which means he will become a free-agent at the end of the 2011 season. The 
failure to sign Pujols has been linked to an inability of the Cardinals to pay for his 
contract, which is expected to at least surpass $250 million in total value with an annual 
value of at least $25 million. This lack of funds has been linked to the Cardinals’ decision 
to sign Matt Holliday to a 7-year, $120 million deal before the 2010 season. Currently, 
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the Cardinals serve as the model of poor financial management throughout mega-
contracts, with over $72 million of the Cardinals’ $93 million payroll tied up in five 
players.38 An extension for Pujols that would match the contract of Alex Rodriguez 
would put those figures at $86 million of $107 million.  
 Of course the idea of such major contracts is that they should make the signing 
team better. However, of these mega-contracts that have seen at least four-years of the 
deal completed, only 4 of the players have played and won the World Series (Barry Zito 
was left off the Giants’ playoff roster). Two of the players played on the same team 
(Yankees), and only one of the listed players has won more than one (Manny Ramirez) 
under their mega-contract. Without coincidence, none of the pitchers on the mega-
contract list have won a World Series or even pitched in a World Series game. The 
chances of success for players of such mega-contract pitchers is nearly impossible to 
predict, and, because starting pitchers do not play every day, their impact on a team’s 
performance is much less noticeable than an everyday player. However, with only four 
players winning World Series titles and only five players reaching the World Series 
(Giambi), the purpose of these mega-contracts seems to be lost.  
 It is not only the mega-contracts that have been shown to be failures for Major 
League teams either. As a whole, free agency deals seem to not have the desired impact 
regardless of where the moves are made. Throughout an analysis of the top three-tiers of 
the past four free-agency periods (2006-2009) of free agents (defined by the top contracts 
in total value) the following was found39 40: 
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- Only twenty out of a possible 120 players made an all-star team ever during their 
contract period. 
- Only 9 of these all-stars came from the top-10 of their free-agency class 
- Of those twenty players only four were selected to multiple all-star games under 
their contracts signed (Alex Rodriguez, Alfonso Soriano, Mariano Rivera, 
Francisco Cordero).  
- All four of the players with multiple all-star appearances came from the top tier 
of their free agency class.  
- Of the four multi-year, All-Stars: Rodriguez and Rivera are Hall-of-Fame 
Candidates  
- The average top-tier total salary was $64,628,000 and 4.5 years, coming out to an 
average, annual salary of $14,665,000  
- The average second-tier total salary was $18,381,000 and 2.5 years, coming out 
to an average, annual salary of $7,427,000  
- Of the 40 top-tier players, 23 played on playoff teams … 21 from the second-tier 
- Teams with the most signings of top FA’s: Yankees (10), Red Sox (8), Cubs (7), 
Phillies (6), Dodgers (6), Angels (6)  
 
This means that in a free-agency period, there is a less than 17% chance that one of the 
top 30 free-agents will be an all-star in the future, and it means that there is a less than 
5% chance that a player signed via free agency will be selected to more than one all-star 
team. And that if one is to sign a multi-year all-star; the signing will have to be made 
throughout the top tier of free agency. But even then the odds of success are lower than 
the numbers suggest. Two of the best free-agent signings from the top-tier have Hall-of-
Fame credentials, signaling that they are extraordinary players. Two of these four players 
are also closers (defined as pitchers who primarily pitch in save situations), which is 
widely considered to be one of the most volatile and easiest positions to fill. This means 
that it is even less likely that one will be able to sign a “franchise” player throughout free-
agency. Of the players from the top-two tiers, over half of them played for 6 clubs. Not 
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coincidentally all six clubs have been ranked in the top-ten payrolls in baseball, and all 
six clubs have been to the playoffs multiple times over the same time span.  
As the saying goes, “the rich get richer.” It indeed seems to be the case 
throughout the following analysis, but it also shows that these investments do not 
necessarily pay-off in the ways that they were meant to. The likelihood of signing a 
future all-star from the top-tier of free agency is 7.5%. Considering that the average top-
tier free agent makes over $14 million per season for, on average, 5 years is troubling for 
any team making such an investment. Furthermore, these players are incredibly unlikely 
to make more than one all-star team, which is all the more troubling for any team making 
such a commitment to a player. However, the comforting factor for any team that gives 
the most expensive contract of the off-season is that that player would go on to become 
an all-star. While this data sample is small, it is exemplary of the spending habits that 
have occurred in baseball recently. The graph in figure 2 shows that the spending habits 
have dramatically changed in the 2009 off-season, but the 2010 off-season has put 
baseball right back in line with its previous spending habits. Therefore, it seems that 2009 
was more a result of a weak free-agent class than any type of shift in financial spending.  
Figure 2 - Average Price of Free Agent Contracts 
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The Advantages of Younger Players  
 Younger players come with two key advantages over their older counterparts: cost 
and potential. Because of Major League Baseball’s collective bargaining agreement 
players are not eligible for free agency until after six full seasons of major league service. 
If a player’s contract runs out during this time period, he is allowed to re-negotiate his 
contract with his team, but if a price cannot be agreed on, salary arbitration will be 
instituted. Salary arbitration rulings generally work in favor of teams, but there have been 
a few of cases of players who have broken the bank throughout salary arbitration. 
However, the general consensus with top-level talent is to negotiate a contract throughout 
arbitration years at a heavily discounted price. Typically, for a budding super-star, these 
pre-free agency contracts generally are worth less than $30 million total over the course 
of 4 – 5 years. For a lower caliber player, the price tag will come down. Such contracts 
work in favor of management as teams are able to benefit off of reduced prices on 
players, and players are forced to agree to terms as salary arbitration rarely rules in favor 
of them.  
 With discounted prices, teams also gain a huge benefit from having players under 
their control for six years. Because of the current collective bargaining agreement, 
players cannot leave their team if they are tendered until they become free agent eligible. 
This current model is especially preferable for teams that are low in financial resources. 
The Oakland Athletics, Florida Marlins, and Tampa Bay Rays have served as models for 
the past decades as organizations that have relied on young talent in order to build 
competitive ball clubs. These young, talented players are rarely retained and re-signed 
when they hit free-agency. In fact, of every all-star that each of the three teams above has 
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had over the past decade, only one player has been given an extension guaranteed beyond 
his arbitration years, Hanley Ramirez of the Florida Marlins. However, these three teams 
have appeared in the playoffs seven times. The Florida Marlins won the 2003 World 
Series, the Rays went to the 2008 World Series, and the Oakland A’s have appeared in 
the post-season four times over the past decade. These three teams have also sat in the 
bottom half of payrolls every season for the past decade.41 These teams serve as the 
model of efficiency, and they have done so by emphasizing youth, and selling high on 
players’ potential.  
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Chapter 2 - Regression Analysis 
 
 To analyze the effects of the various variables mentioned previously, a multiple 
regression analysis will be used across five separate variables. The independent variables 
will be analyzed for the ability to predict the outcome variables of the study. The purpose 
of the regression analysis is to analyze various variables and see how important they are 
toward the financial and on-field success to a team.  
 
Independent Variables 
Age  
 The first variable that will be analyzed is the average age of major league teams. 
Age is the most obvious indicator of the youth movement. Aside from being an indicator 
of youth, age is also an indicator of the types of players that are signed to baseball 
organizations. Because of the collective bargaining rules within baseball, a player must 
have accumulated at least six years of service time on a Major League roster. The average 
age of a rookie in Major League Baseball during the past decade was approximately 24 
years of age. Under this average age, the average free agency eligible age for a player 
over the last decade would correspond to being approximately 30 years of age. Therefore, 
teams that are heavily reliant on acquisitions of free-agents will employ a higher average 
age than that of teams that rely on prospects.  
 Under the current Major League Baseball rules, the active roster of a team is set at 
25 players until September first of every season. On this date, teams can expand their 
rosters up to 40 players for the active roster. However, for the purposes of this study, age 
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data sets will be analyzed according to the opening day, 25-man rosters. The rationale for 
this is that the increase to 40-man rosters almost always is done by the promotion of 
minor league players to the major league club. Because minor league players tend to be 
on the younger side of the age scale, the September call-ups tend to bring down the 
average age of baseball teams. Furthermore, the original 25-man, opening day roster is 
the core group of players that are expected to make it throughout the entire 162-game 
season for a Major League club. This would imply that they are the most valuable to the 
organization for their overall success, and, therefore, they will have the greatest impact 
on the team’s success.  
 The average age of teams will be acquired using data from ESPN.com  
Number of Players Acquired Throughout Free-Agency  
 While age can be an indicator of free-agent-eligible players, it is not a perfect 
indicator. The age variable also takes into consideration the fact that age itself has its role 
in success. However, the actual number of free-agent acquisitions on Major League 
rosters can provide a more accurate indicator of the effect of free-agency. Also, not all 
free-agents have to have served 6 years of playing time at the Major League level in order 
to be eligible for free-agency. International players do not have to abide by the same rules 
as American players. Players from foreign countries are granted free-agent rights 
immediately upon their ability to enter the Major Leagues.  
 Different international baseball bodies have different rules for the transition to the 
American game, but ultimately players from foreign countries can become eligible for 
free-agency at a younger age than the typical American baseball player. An example of 
this is players who come from the Domincan Republic and surrounding Caribbean 
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region. Players such as Miguel Cabrera of the Detroit Tigers can be signed as free-agents 
at as young as 16 years-old. After signing, these players can either come to America to 
play in the American system (typically in the minors), or, more commonly, these players 
will stay in the Caribbean to develop within their signing team’s own training facilities 
until they are ready to play in American leagues.42 Across the Pacific, the ability to sign 
foreign players is much more difficult. While the Caribbean is practically unregulated, 
Asian baseball players typically require more financial investment. Because of the 
existence of established, money-making professional leagues in Asia, Major League 
teams must buy out the contract of a player from his Asian-league team. This process 
typically operates like an auction, with the Asian team accepting the highest bid. From 
there, a player is then given a short window to negotiate a contract with the Major League 
team, and sign as a free-agent. The most expensive Asian player signed to a Major 
League team was Daisuke Matsuzaka of the Seibu Lions in 2006. The rights to negotiate 
with Matsuzaka were sold to the Boston Red Sox with a bid of $51.1 million (nearly 
three times the Seibu Lions’ payroll that year), and Matsuzaka signed a contract with the 
Red Sox worth a guaranteed $52 million in 2006.43 Matsuzaka’s signing with the Red 
Sox is an extreme example of the negotiations that can take place with Asian teams, 
which is generally why Asian players are not recruited at a high rate to Major League 
Baseball.  
Another exception can come with non-tendered free-agent players, who are 
players that are ineligible for free-agency, but are not tendered contracts by their club 
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after their contract has expired. This is rare, and is especially rare to see with star players. 
However, the important thing to be noted in analyzing the number of free-agent 
acquisitions is the fact that a team is choosing to acquire talent outside of its own 
organization. Such a transaction shows that the organization was unable to find a better 
player within their own organization, and they decided the best course of action would be 
to sign a player from the outside of the organization.  
 Data for this variable was done throughout an analysis of player histories for 
every player on a Major League opening day roster through baseball-reference.com and 
ESPN.com.  
Number of All-Star Players  
 The number of All-Stars on a single Major League Roster is indicative of the 
quality of talent that exists on a team. These players also tend to be the players that can 
demand the most money during free-agency. But this variable is under analysis primarily 
to distinguish the importance of All-Star players on the ability for a team to be successful 
financially and competitively. All-Stars are the players that teams will market behind and 
use to sell tickets and merchandise. All-Stars are the players on a franchise who sell the 
most jerseys, shirts, posters, etc. They are generally the most popular players of a 
franchise, and they are generally perceived to be the most predictive of a team’s success.  
 However, as mentioned earlier, the quantity of All-Stars does not always indicate 
the success of a team on the field. Therefore, this analysis can also help shed some light 
on the importance of individual talents toward the success of a team.  
 However, there are some limitations to this variable. The first limitation is that the 
Major League Baseball All-Star game requires that every team be represented in the 
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game. This has resulted in some controversy as some teams that have been unsuccessful 
must still have an All-Star on their team. Such a system has ultimately led to the 
exclusion of statistically high-performing players for players that needed to be selected to 
meet the game’s rules. Another limitation is the size of rosters for All-Star teams. As of 
2010, All-Star game rosters got to be expanded to 33 players from the previous number 
of 32. While this is a greater number than the active rosters of regular season teams of 25, 
there have been complaints that the size of the roster leaves out many deserving 
individuals.  
 Finally, the last limitation is that all starting position players of the All-Star game 
are selected by fan vote, and not by their statistical performance. This voting system has 
lead to statistically undeserving players getting to not only start the All-Star game, but 
also be selected to the All-Star game. A popular example of this has been the selection of 
Ichiro Suzuki to the American League All-Star game every year of his ten-year career. 
While Ichiro has been deserving of this honor, he has been a leading vote-getter several 
years because of his monopolization of the Japanese population both in the US and 
abroad.  
 For the purposes of this study, All-Star data will only be extracted from the 2010 
season, and not previous seasons. This is intended to control for the effect of a single 
player receiving multiple All-Star selections, and, therefore, creating the illusion of 
multiple All-Star players for a team. Also because the dependent variables are for the 
2010 season, the “best” players of the 2010 season would theoretically be on the 2010 
All-Star teams.  
Number of Transactions per a Season  
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 This variable is intended to analyze the effect of managerial intervention on a 
team from season-to-season and over the course of the season. Because of the differing 
philosophies within baseball today, it is important to evaluate the efficacy of these 
different ideologies.  
 The number of transactions per a season will include all transactions made over 
the course of a season beginning at the end of the 2009 World Series to the beginning of 
the 2011 Major League Baseball season. This time frame will include transactions that 
occur both before and during the course of the 2010 baseball season, and the following 
off-season. The inclusion of the winter of 2011 is to correspond with the data of operating 
income, which incorporates the most recent off-season in its projections of Major League 
Baseball finances.   
 A transaction will be defined as the trade of a player, the signing of player 
throughout free agency, the claiming of a player through waivers, promotion of a player 
from the minor leagues, and any other similar transactions that involve the acquisition of 
a Major League level player. Minor league player acquisitions will not be included in this 
variable except for those acquired throughout trades. This means that players selected in 
the 2010 Major League Baseball Amateur Draft will not be included unless they made the 
Major League team during the same season. The number of players involved in a trade 
will not be counted toward the variable. All trades of players will be treated as a single 
transaction as players are often traded in unbalanced numbers.  
 Transactions data will be acquired through the use of mlbtraderumors.com’s 
transaction tracker tool.  
Payroll  
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 Team payroll expresses the amount of financial investment placed in a team. 
Theoretically, high payrolls should express the quality of talent that exists on a major 
league team, which should, therefore, express the success of a team. Of course, this has 
been shown to not always be the case. Team payrolls also can be indicative of the amount 
and quality of free-agent talent on a team. The most talented free-agents demand the most 
money, and therefore a larger payroll can be indicative of this. By the same logic, 
payrolls are also indicative of a team that relies more heavily on younger talent, as a 
lower payroll could indicate.  
 Payroll data has been acquired through USA Today.  
Dependent Variables 
Winning Percentage  
 Winning is the most obvious indicator of on-field success. The choice of winning 
percentage lies in its ability to incorporate both wins and losses into a single statistic. In 
general terms, a team is considered to be very successful if it is able to maintain a 
winning percentage of at least .500. This means that a team that has won at least 50% of 
its games is considered to be successful, by the general population of baseball observers. 
 However, Major League Baseball’s playoff system only incorporates eight total 
teams from all of Major League Baseball’s 30 teams. In fact, for 2010, the lowest 
winning percentage of a playoff team was .556 (Texas Rangers), which equals a record of 
90 wins and 72 losses, or nine games over a 50% winning percentage. Therefore, it seems 
unfair to assess a team’s success based solely on their playoff eligibility.  
Operating Income  
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 The use of operating income is to show profit margins for Major League Baseball 
teams. Revenue is a misleading and biased statistic that favors big market teams such as 
the New York Yankees and New York Mets. Team value is also a biased indicator 
because of various team assets that can lead to a high value (i.e. new stadiums) and the 
location of team can also play a huge role on the value of an organization. Operating 
income is defined by the following equation:  
Operating Income = Gross Income – Operating Expenses – Depreciation 
 All earnings are calculated before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. 
In the case of a baseball organization, operating income will take into account total 
revenues minus expenditures such as payroll expenses, stadium operating costs, etc.  
All operating income figures will be taken from Forbes Magazine’s projections of 
operating income before the 2011 Major League season. Forbes Magazine’s projections 
are based off of the finances of Major League teams from the previous season (in this 
case, 2010). This makes the 2011 projections correspond directly to the data that is being 
collected on the 2010 season, and the projections incorporate the expenditures made by a 
team in the off-season (i.e. free agent signings).  
 When considering the emphasis on youth and young talent, and the decline of 
aging players, the expectation of the analysis is that age will have a negative relationship 
with winning percentage. That is that younger teams will have higher winning 
percentages than older teams. On the operating income, the expectation with age will be 
that younger teams will also be more profitable. Meaning that age will also have a 
negative relationship on profitability.  
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 The number of All-Stars on a team roster is expected to have a positive 
relationship on team performance and profits. Star players are given that designation 
because of their contributions to their team. Therefore it is almost intuitive to expect the 
teams with the most All-Stars to perform the best. All-Stars are also among the most well 
known players in addition to their success. This makes them the most marketable players, 
and should make result in making their teams profitable.  
 The number of free-agent acquisitions on a roster is expected to play negatively 
toward the winning percentage of a team. Multiple acquisitions throughout free-agency 
imply that there is a weak prospect development system. While some teams can afford to 
fill their team with highly successful free-agents, there are only a select few in each free 
agency class. This means that the rest of the free-agents acquired will not be able to 
perform for their team. Because of their lack of marketability and on-field success, it 
seems unlikely to expect a positive relationship on team operating income.  
 At the management level, total number of transactions are expected also have a 
negative impact on winning percentage. While higher caliber players may be acquired 
throughout trades, the rarity of such transactions makes it unlikely that a high volume 
will have a significant impact. Also because major transactions of star players generally 
require prospects, who will not make an impact at the major league level, the positives of 
a star player will be cancelled out.  
Payroll is expected to have a positive impact on team winning percentage. While 
there are some teams that are ultimately successful with modest payrolls, there are several 
teams that are successful with high payrolls. Furthermore, there are several teams at the 
bottom of the payroll pyramid who may eventually become competitive, but these teams 
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are not ready to compete yet. Because of the concept of building teams in windows, not 
all teams that have small payrolls can be expected to succeed at the same time. However, 
payroll is hypothesized to have a negative impact on profitability. Because of the 
significant costs of high payrolls, plus the costs of stadiums and other operating costs, 
teams must generate a huge amount of revenue to cover their losses. 
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Chapter 3 - Results 
 
 Based on the results from the regression analysis for the dependent variable of 
winning percentage the following was found. Across all five variables of analysis the 
total variance accounted for yielded an adjusted R-square value of .511. The number of 
All-Star players significantly predicted winning percentage, ß = .705, t(24) = 4.490, p < 
.01. This finding was not surprising as the best players in the league should make an 
impact on team performance. Such a finding is more intuitive than anything. Age 
displayed, ß = .351, t(24) = 2.248, p <.05. This finding was contradictory to the 
predictions made at the beginning of the experiment. It was believed that youth would be 
the key to success, but the results indicate that older players have a significant positive 
impact on a team’s winning percentage. Finally, the last significant finding was within 
the transactions variable, ß = -.313, t (24) = -2.164, p < .05. The more transactions made 
by a team over the course of one year actually had a negative impact on the team’s 
performance.44  
 When looking at the operating income dependent variable, the regression analysis 
produced an adjusted r-sqaure value was -.029. This indicates that there is a great deal of 
explanatory data missing from the model, which also indicates that the variables chosen 
do not have any significant impact on the outcome variable (operational income). None 
of the independent variables were significant at the .05 significance level. The results of 
this variable analysis are not surprising though. Looking at the data for operational 
income, the distribution is scattered across the board. The data for operational income 
seems to indicate that other factors are at play besides the variables listed for analysis. An 
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example of this is seeing a small market team like the Oakland A’s, who enjoyed modest 
success in 2010 (winning percentage of .500), but play in one of the worst stadiums in 
baseball. The A’s posted a very profitable season according to operational income at 
$23.2 million, which was greater than some big market teams. The New York Mets 
posted a negative operating income of - $6.2 million. The Atlanta Braves posted a 
winning percentage of .562, had 10 more wins than the A’s, and made the playoffs, but 
had an operating income of $22.2 million. 45  
 The results show that more analysis is required on the financial side of baseball, 
and that there is still more variance to be accounted for within winning percentage. But 
the financial side is the most intriguing because it shows that team performance seems to 
have very little impact on team profitability, and the amount of money invested in a team 
payroll also seems to not show profitability. The latter is particularly interesting because 
bigger payrolls generally signify more generous owners, which has generally translated to 
better ballpark experiences for fans.  
The data was also analyzed throughout correlations between the independent 
variables to investigate possible relationships between variables. Throughout the 
correlation analysis of independent variables, significant correlations were found 
between: age and payroll (.513), free agent acquisitions and payroll (.559), and number of 
all-stars and payroll (.444).  This data supports the previous assumptions made about 
payroll and its effect on team management. Higher payrolls allow teams to purchase free-
agent, All-Star, players, who are generally older. And, obviously, more acquisitions 
yields more dollars spent on payroll. 
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Chapter 4 - Discussion of Results 
The use of the regression analysis was meant to evaluate various variables that 
play economic roles in Major League Baseball team management. Looking at the 
regression data for a team’s winning percentage, the five variables under analysis account 
for just under 60% of the variance in team winning percentage. The most important 
factors that played into this percentage were the number of all-stars present on a team, the 
average age of the team, and team payroll.  
 The number of All-Stars present on a Major League roster played the most 
significant role in determining the amount of variance in winning percentage. This 
finding seems fairly logical. As All-Stars are selected based on their performance during 
the season, it makes sense that the more All-Stars present on a team, the better the team 
will perform on the field. For the 2010 baseball season, the teams that were the most 
represented at the All-Star Game were: the New York Yankees (8), Atlanta Braves (6), 
Boston Red Sox (6), and the Texas Rangers (6). All four teams performed at winning 
percentages over .540, which translates to 87.48 wins over a 162-game season. Three of 
these four teams made the playoffs during the 2010 season, with the Texas Rangers 
making the World Series. If the data is expanded, one can see that twelve teams had 3 or 
more players represented on an All-Star team in 2010. Of that twelve, ten teams had 
winning percentages of .500 or higher, and six of the eight playoff teams fell in this 
group. No playoff team made the post-season with only one All-Star on their roster.  
 There are some possible confounds with the use of All-Stars as a variable. 
Because of the team nature of the sport, players can benefit from being surrounded by 
other successful players. A recent of example of this came in 2009 when Matt Holliday 
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began his season with Oakland A’s before being traded to the St. Louis Cardinals at the 
mid-season trade deadline. Holliday was traded to the Oakland A’s after the 2008 
baseball season, in which he made his third consecutive all-star team. However, upon 
being traded to the Oakland A’s, Holliday’s production fell off. Oakland’s roster was 
lackluster throughout the season. The team finished in the bottom half of the American 
League in every offensive production category and the team finished with a record of 75-
87 and finishing in last place in the American League West. Holliday performed at 
underwhelming levels and was not selected to the 2009 All-Star game. Upon his arrival 
in St. Louis though, he returned to his perennial All-Star form. Despite playing in 30 less 
games and having 111 fewer at-bats, Holliday out-performed his production in Oakland 
in nearly every offensive category. The St. Louis Cardinals were in competition for the 
playoffs when they acquired Holliday, and the team had an impressive roster of three All-
Star players, two Cy Young Award finalists, and National League MVP, Albert Pujols. 
The Oakland A’s sported a roster of overall mediocrity. The A’s had only one All-Star in 
2009, closer Andrew Bailey, and the team had played itself out of playoff contention 
before July 1st.  
Figure 3 - Matt Holliday 2009 Stats46 
Tm   G   AB   R   H   HOMERUN   RBI   SB   BA   OBP   SLG   OPS   OPS+   TB   
TOT   156 581 94 182 24 109 14 0.313 0.394 0.515 0.909 139 299 
OAK  93 346 52 99 11 54 12 0.286 0.378 0.454 0.831 119 157 
STL  63 235 42 83 13 55 2 0.353 0.419 0.604 1.023 169 142 
 
 Another confound within this variable is that All-Star game starters are subjected 
to fan vote and player vote. As mentioned earlier this allows a player to be selected to the 
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All-Star game by popularity rather than production. This often occurs in instances where 
a recognizable player plays for a strong baseball club. An example of this was the 
selection of Jason Varitek to the 2008 All-Star game. Despite hitting .218 in the first half 
and collecting more strikeouts than hits, Varitek made the All-Star team by the vote of his 
peers. Varitek’s reputation from previous seasons as one of the best catchers in baseball 
and catching for the Boston Red Sox, earned him the support and votes of his peers. But 
his selection is widely considered to be one of the worst All-Star selections in recent 
memory.47  
 As was also mentioned before, the mandatory requirement of every team having 
an All-Star representative also creates a possibility of confounds. If such a rule were 
eliminated, it is possible that the variance in winning percentage accounted for by the 
number of All-Stars would be even greater.  
 Surprisingly, age had the opposite relationship to the variance in winning 
percentage. It was hypothesized that younger ages would be a predictor of team winning 
percentage, but it turned out to be the opposite. The older a team was, the better on-field 
performance could be expected. The five oldest teams in Major League Baseball for the 
2010 season were: the Philadelphia Phillies (30.67), Boston Red Sox (29.95), Toronto 
Blue Jays (29.89), Houston Astros (29.79), and the New York Yankees (29.65). Four of 
the five mentioned teams posted winning percentages over .500, with the Yankees and 
Phillies making the postseason. The five youngest teams in Major League Baseball were: 
the Pittsburgh Pirates (26.99), Florida Marlins (27.33), Texas Rangers (27.67), Tampa 
Bay Rays (27.77), and the Arizona Diamondbacks (27.80). The Texas Rangers and 
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Tampa Bay Rays both made the playoffs and entered the post-season. However, the 
Pittsburgh Pirates were the worst team in baseball winning only 57 wins in 2010.  
 When looking at the average ages of these teams it can be seen that the average 
age of the youngest teams in major league baseball all fall below the typical free-agency 
starting period. This means that these teams have the fewest free-agent acquisitions of all 
teams, which is supported by the fact that all five of the youngest teams had the fewest 
free-agent acquisitions on their ball-clubs. Conversely, the oldest teams had almost twice 
as many free-agent signees on their rosters. Furthermore, the youngest teams possessed 
the cheapest payrolls while the oldest had the most expensive payrolls.48  
 These results indicate that the model of poor teams is to rely on younger talent, 
not dip into the free-agency pool, and, if so, sign cheap free-agents and not top players. 
This model of management is the most fiscally conservative method of action, unlike the 
wealthy teams. These teams rely much less on their own talent development, and these 
teams rely on free-agent players to build their rosters. This analysis also shows that this 
method of business is the most successful style of management for on-field success, as 
the oldest teams posted over 56 more combined wins than the youngest teams.  
While some of the younger teams have been successful (Texas and Tampa Bay), 
others have not (Pittsburgh and Arizona). These discouraging results show one of the 
most important factors to note when looking at the value of young players; there is no 
proof that they will be successful at the Major League Level. The Pittsburgh Pirates have 
drafted in the top half of the draft every year for the past decade, drafting in the top ten 
picks eight times. Going back further, the Pirates have drafted outside of the first half of 
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the baseball draft once since 1993.49 This means that the team has had the opportunity to 
draft the most talented players of the draft sixteen times. Of these prospects, not a single 
player has made an All-Star game. Once again going further, looking at the top five picks 
made the Pirates in every draft since 1993 (totaling 85 players), only two players drafted 
by the Pirates have been All-Stars, and neither made an All-Star team as a member of the 
Pirates. Comparatively, the Tampa Bay Rays have only drafted players since 1996, but 
have produced three Major League players that made the All-Star team for the Rays.50  
The Rays have also produced more major league level players in the same comparison 
with 31 to the Pirates’ 23. The Rays have been very successful in their drafting and 
player development process, and the Pirates can be considered to be abnormally bad with 
their drafting and player development. However, the two teams’ opposite fates show how 
much chance exists in the talent development process.  
Finally, the results of payroll are not surprising when considering that throughout 
the correlation analysis it was found that the number of all-stars on a team and payroll 
exhibited a positive relationship of .444. All-Stars demand large salaries. While it was 
shown earlier that the probability to sign an All-Star throughout free-agency is low, 
especially a repeat All-Star, rich teams often times are able to retain their All-Star 
players, preventing them from walking to free-agency. For example, Miguel Cabrera has 
never been a free-agent because he was signed to a large extension by the Detroit Tigers 
before he was eligible for free-agency. Cabrera will get to test free-agency for the first 
time in 2016 when he is 32, which will be 14 years after he began his career. Joe Mauer 
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also signed a major extension with the Minnesota Twins prior to the 2010 season, which 
will prevent him from testing free agency until 2019.  
When looking at operating income, it is clear that there is very little predictability 
that is controlled by management and players. Player performance was shown to very 
little impact on a team’s operational income. This finding was particularly surprising, 
considering that team’s emphasize star players to market teams. Furthermore, under the 
correlation analysis, winning percentage and operating income were shown to have a 
very weak correlation (.059). This result indicates that there is little relationship between 
on-field success and financial success. While surprising, these findings make sense when 
looking at attendance data for 2010. Two of the bottom five teams in attendance 
(Oakland and Toronto) performed with winning records in 2010 and, on average, filled 
their ballparks to approximately 40% capacity. The New York Mets averaged 77.8% 
capacity attendance despite a .488 winning percentage over 2010. 51  Ticket sales 
typically account for at least 70% of team revenues. Without sales, teams cannot increase 
their profit, which means that they cannot acquire greater talent throughout free-agency 
or resigning existing talent.  
A huge factor for teams at the bottom of attendance is not their performance, but 
their stadiums. The Oakland A’s, Toronto Blue Jays, and Florida Marlins (who finished 
one game below .500) play in three of the oldest stadiums in baseball. The Oakland 
Coliseum is the oldest stadium in baseball that has not undergone serious renovations 
(Dodger Stadium and Angel Stadium) or is not a historical landmark (Wrigley Field and 
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Fenway Park).52 Dolphin Stadium (where the Marlins play) and the Oakland Coliseum 
were ranked by Forbes Magazine as the two worst ballparks in baseball. On the opposite 
side of the spectrum, the Yankees and Phillies play in two of the most popular parks, 
which are also two of the newest baseball stadiums in the league. The New Yankee 
Stadium is also the most expensive baseball park ever built at over $1 billion.53  
The results leave us supporting the model of the big-market teams. The data 
indicates that older, star-studded, wealthy teams perform the best on the field and, based 
on the model of analysis, they perform the best in the profit margins as well. Such results 
support the model of capitalism and free-market economies that baseball emphasizes. If a 
team has an abundance of financial resources, they will be able to buy the best players via 
free-agency, keep their top players throughout resigning, and they attract the most people 
to their games, which keep their financial resources plentiful. Small-market teams need to 
stick with their model of fiscal frugality and youth development. Some teams have 
developed successful variations of this model (Oakland and Tampa Bay), but such a 
model only gives a team windows of success. No team over the past decade has been able 
to replicate the sustained success of the New York Yankees with such limited financial 
resources.  
Another hope for these small-market teams is the construction of a new ballpark. 
This model has turned the Minnesota Twins from a small-market team to mid-sized 
franchise. With the opening of Target Park in 2010, the Twins were able to up their 
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payroll to $97.5 million from $65 million the year before.54 With the opening of Target 
Park, the Twins signed All-Star catcher Joe Mauer to a $185 million contract extension, 
the richest contract ever signed by a catcher. The Twins also generated an operating 
income of $26.5 million in 2010, while upping their franchise value to an estimated $490 
million (up $85 million from 2009).55 However, the A’s and Rays both currently are 
struggling to gain enough support to fund new ballparks, in spite of their success. With 
the current economic downturn and the struggling real estate markets, it seems unlikely 
that either team will be able to begin build a new ballpark for several years.  
 
Future Research 
For future research, it is recommended that research be conducted to further 
analyze the importance of ballparks toward the financial success and prosperity of 
franchises. Future research should also be directed toward finding more meaningful 
predictors toward the economic success of teams (operating income or other measures). 
Such research will be invaluable toward the future of the business of Major League 
Baseball.  
Individual analysis of player performance and age, independent of team 
performance, would be interesting to see the true value of young players within the 
greater context of baseball. While the results of this analysis indicate that younger players 
seem to be more useful as financial relief, future research may indicate otherwise. 
                                                 
54
 USATODAY. "2011 MLB Salaries by Team,” USATODAY.com, accessed March 31, 2011, 
http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/baseball/mlb/salaries/team.  
55
 Forbes Magazine, "Forbes Valuations of the 30 Clubs in MLB," accessed March 31, 2011, 
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_wrapper&Itemid=126.  
Youth in MLB 51 
 
 
Finally, future analysis should be directed toward management itself. Future 
research should focus on the characteristics that make management successful. Such 
characteristics would include financial characteristics, but also personal qualities that 
have allowed certain general managers to stay successful. It would be interesting to see 
how management approaches player development as well. Such an analysis would 
provide insight into why certain teams continuously produce excellent players and why 
others seem to fail.  
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Chapter 5 - Case Study: All-Star for Prospect Trades 
No organization can be successful without successful players. These teams have 
had several all-stars come throughout their organizations, and, as mentioned earlier, they 
almost always leave the team during free-agency. But the business model of these 
organizations is to let these players walk, or if possible, trade them before they hit free-
agency. Under the current collective bargaining agreement, teams are compensated for 
the loss of top players with draft picks. While the one-to-one addition system seems fair, 
teams often times attempt to try to exchange star players for multiple prospects. Over the 
past five seasons this trend has become increasingly frequent. Players that are on their 
way to free-agency are often times flipped for prospects in one-for-three/four/five player 
deals. These trades are often made to competing teams looking to try and add the missing 
piece to the championship puzzle. However, the question is how successful is this 
strategy? Teams that have gutted their farm systems for the prize of the trade market have 
rarely become the winners of the baseball season.  
C.C. Sabathia: Traded from the Cleveland Indians to the Milwaukee Brewers 
CC Sabathia was traded from the Rangers to the Milwaukee Brewers during the 
final season of his pre-free agency contract as the Brewers were preparing to make a run 
at the post-season. Sabathia was electric in Milwaukee, posting a 10-1 record over 16 
starts56 and pitching heroically on short rest for the final two weeks of the season. 
Milwaukee made the post-season, but the Brewers were eliminated in the first round of 
post-season play. Sabathia walked on to free-agency and signed with the New York 
Yankees. Under the terms of the original trade, the Brewers dealt four prospects, one 
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(Matt LaPorta) was ranked among the best prospects in baseball, to the Cleveland Indians 
for Sabathia. LaPorta was the 7th overall pick of the 2007 amateur draft and will be 26 
years old heading into this season. LaPorta’s career has hardly been of note. LaPorta has 
yet to play in a full-season and has not come close to putting up noteworthy numbers.57 
LaPorta still has time to develop into a good player, but the odds of success seem to 
dwindling. The lack of success for LaPorta seems to indicate that the Indians have lost in 
this deal. However, the Brewers may come out as the ultimate losers as they lost not only 
the players they traded for Sabathia, but Sabathia himself in exchange for unproven, 
unpredictable talent through compensation picks.  
Johan Santana: Traded to the New York Mets from the Minnesota Twins  
 Johan Santana was once considered to be the unquestionable ace of Major League 
Baseball. Santana burst onto the scene as a success at the age of 24 when he posted an 
impressive 3.07 ERA, with an equally impressive 12-3 record for the Minnesota Twins in 
2003. Following that season he would continue for four more seasons of pure dominance, 
winning two Cy-Young Awards, leading the league in strikeouts three consecutive years 
(2004-2006), averaging 17.5 wins, averaging 6.35 wins above the replacement level per 
season,58 and capturing the Major League Pitching Triple Crown (leading the league in 
wins, ERA, and strikeouts). In spite of his great success, the Minnesota Twins were still a 
small-market team, with limited resources and a payroll of $71 million, and the Twins 
elected to trade Santana before his final contract year in 2008.  
 The New York Mets outbid the Boston Red Sox and traded four prospects to the 
Twins: Carlos Gomez, Phil Humber, Deolis Guerra, and Kevin Mulvey. The Mets were 
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also able to sign Santana to an extension of six years and $137.5 million as a part of the 
deal. The results of this trade are not encouraging for the Minnesota Twins. While the 
Twins have still maintained a playoff competitive club, their sustained success has not 
been the result of their haul from the Santana deal. Only Guerra is still with the Twins 
organization, but he has not made it to the Major League level yet. In fact, only one 
player (Gomez) has managed to spend an entire season at the Major League level. Of the 
four players combined they have produced a combined Wins Above Replacement value 
of 1.4 for 2010, and none of them are highly regarded for the future at this point. Santana 
has gone on to pitch three seasons for the Mets. Santana has been overall a successful 
pitcher, posting a Wins Above Replacement value of 4.8 over his three seasons. 
However, Santana has been plagued with injury issues throughout his time with the Mets, 
and he has had the dissatisfaction of playing for a struggling franchise in the New York 
Mets, who have not made a post-season appearance since acquiring Santana. But the 
results speak for themselves, Santana has been infinitely more valuable to the Mets than 
any of the prospects that he was traded for.  
Curt Schilling: Traded from the Arizona Diamondbacks to the Boston Red Sox  
 Curt Schilling’s career in Arizona had resulted in their World Series title in 2001, 
but, following their title run, the Diamondbacks began regressing almost immediately. 
With Schilling’s contract set to expire after the 2004 season, the Diamondbacks began 
looking to trade the Cy-Young Award winner in exchange for talent to rebuild the club. 
The Boston Red Sox stepped in and offered a package of pitchers: Jorge De La Rosa, 
Brandon Lyon, Casey Fossum, and prospect Michael Goss.  
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 The Red Sox can be labeled the clear winners of this trade. Six years later, not a 
single player involved in the trade is still with the Diamondbacks. De La Rosa has 
developed into a promising pitcher, but he now pitches for the Colorado Rockies after a 
series of dealings. Lyon would serve in the bullpen adequately, but never at an elite level. 
Fossum and Goss can be labeled as busts. On the other hand, Curt Schilling would lead 
the Red Sox to their first World Series title in 86 years in 2004, pitching heroically 
throughout a serious ankle injury that bled throughout his sock during Game 2 of the 
World Series. He would then go on to lead the Red Sox to another World Series title in 
2007, sealing his Hall-of-Fame resume. Schilling will most likely be a first-ballot Hall-
of-Famer when his name comes up for election in 2012.  
Billy Beane and the Oakland A’s: The Master Dealer 
The Oakland A’s most famous member may be its general manager, Billy Beane. 
Beane has set a new standard of managerial prowess as the Oakland A’s have been able 
to be one of the most successful franchises in Major League Baseball, despite having a 
payroll that has always fallen into the bottom-third of Major League clubs. The Oakland 
A’s have made the post-season five times over the previous decade and compiled 
winning records in eight seasons. The A’s are also well known for being the subject of 
the national bestseller, Moneyball, which focused on the team’s unorthodox approach to 
management and player evaluation.  
Billy Beane and the Oakland A’s have been among the most successful teams of 
this past decade because of their unorthodox approach and creativity. One of Beane’s was 
most famous moves came when dealing away two-thirds of his prized “Big Three” for 
prospects and continuing to compete. Oakland’s “Big Three” were pitchers Tim Hudson, 
Youth in MLB 56 
 
 
Mark Mulder, and Barry Zito. All three were All-Stars multiple times during their tenure 
with the A’s and perennial Cy-Young Award contenders. However, as free-agency lurked 
with the three pitchers, the A’s looked to make the most of their assets.  
Pitchers Tim Hudson and Mark Mulder were traded within 2 weeks of each other 
before the start of the 2005 baseball season. Hudson’s trade ultimately did not create an 
impressive return for the ace. The key piece of the trade, Dan Meyer, was eventually 
waived by the A’s after failing to record a win at the Major League level. Hudson has 
been a great success to the Atlanta Braves overall, averaging a Wins Above Replacement 
value of 2.88 over six seasons.59 However, Mulder’s trade turned into a great success for 
Oakland and colossal failure for the St. Louis Cardinals. Mulder’s trade produced two 
future starters for the A’s: Daric Barton and Dan Haren. Haren would go on become an 
All-Star with the A’s, and Barton is the team’s current starting first baseman. The 
Cardinals got only 55 games out of Mulder over four seasons, which were plagued with 
injuries. Despite numerous comeback attempts, Mulder has not played at the Major 
League level since the 2008 season, essentially ending his career at only 30 years old.60  
Haren would ultimately be traded to the Arizona Diamondbacks for six players. 
Among the trade haul for Haren were Carlos Gonzalez and Brett Anderson. Carlos 
Gonzalez would be used in a 2009 trade to acquire perennial All-Star Matt Holliday, but 
has developed into a star after two seasons. Gonzalez finished third in the NL MVP 
voting in 2010 and was awarded the Gold Glove for his position. Brett Anderson is the 
current anchor of another deep, talented Oakland pitching staff that is expected to 
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compete for another post-season berth. The Matt Holliday acquisition was intended to 
give the A’s a trade chip for the mid-season trade deadline, which he did. The A’s once 
again made a deal to acquire more prospects.  
 The lone remaining member of the original “Big Three,” Barry Zito was 
unceremoniously let go and signed with the neighboring San Francisco Giants in 2008. 
Zito signed the most expensive contract ever for a pitcher at 7-years worth at least $126 
million. Zito has been a complete failure since his arrival in San Francisco, failing to 
return to the All-Star game, and he was left off the Giants’ post-season roster during their 
World Series title run in 2010.  
 Billy Beane and the A’s are frequent movers in the trade market. They have had 
their successes and failures. But most importantly, they show to be the only team, of the 
above-mentioned cases, that has been able to create successful trades for all-star players. 
The trades of Mark Mulder and Dan Haren have been rare examples of the past decade 
where a team has lost an all-star and replaced him with not even serviceable players, let 
alone an all-star. The Schilling, Santana, and Sabathia deals can be looked at as major 
losses to the teams that lost their super-stars. These also serve as examples of how youth 
is over-valued more than it needs to be in baseball today. An all-star is a rare player to 
have, and, as shown by the regression analysis, play a significant role in the on-field 
success of an organization. Furthermore, despite being frugal, the operating income of a 
team is still heavily reliant on the amount of financial investment made on a ball club.  
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Chapter 6 - Final Thoughts 
 
 The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the current management structures that 
exist within baseball. Today youth is stressed so much, but, as this thesis has shown, it 
appears that baseball today is truly over-valuing the potential of players. As shown by the 
case study analysis and regression analysis, on-field success is best maintained 
throughout the use of Major League-proven players. While their output may decline 
throughout their 30s, their trajectory is more predictable than a minor league prospect. 
Teams that have the opportunity to acquire an All-Star-caliber player throughout trade of 
prospects should almost always take such deals. Simple statistics even emphasize this 
fact. If only 68 players are selected to the All-Star game and 750 players are on opening 
day rosters, less than 10% of players in Major League Baseball are “stars.” If we take into 
consideration the fact that every team has to be represented and, as a result, a few players 
are not statistically a superstar, which leaves an even smaller percentage of true stars.  
Ten years ago, Baseball America ranked their top 100 prospects. Today, the top 
100 players in baseball who were prospects in 2001 look very different. In total there 
were 76 different players among the two lists, with 24 players being on both lists. This 
means that only 24% of players in the top 100 from 2001 were ranked among the top 100 
players ten years later (see Appendix E).61 Perennial All-Stars such as Hanley Ramirez 
and Matt Holliday went unranked, while players like Corey Patterson, who today are 
unknown to the common fan, were ranked at the top of the list. Some players have 
crossed over between lists, but the results show that the future of prospects is uncertain. 
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Such uncertainty makes it hard to compete with the guaranteed performance of a proven 
Major League player.  
However, there is a justified position for the stance of teams that have dealt away 
their All-Stars. Financially, it makes the most sense for a team that is seemingly unable to 
re-sign a player to deal him away for whatever prospects they can acquire. In the case of 
these deals, teams must ask themselves if it is worth taking two first round draft picks or 
possibly as many as five prospects. Such a proposition depends on the position of the 
organization, and the timing of their windows. If a window or competitiveness is near, it 
may be best to acquire prospects from a team in a trade, who are likely to be closer to the 
Major League level than throughout the draft. It is also easier to predict a career 
trajectory of a player with more data, which favors minor league prospects.  
Another justification for trading away All-Stars is that, based on the model of 
analysis, a team will need at least two All-Stars to be seriously competitive. Seventeen 
out of twenty-one teams with two or more All-Stars produced winning records. No team 
with one All-Star produced a winning record in baseball last year. And no team with one 
All-Star had a better record than any team with multiple All-Stars. The failure of these 
teams can be tied to the fact that they simply do not even have a player of All-Star 
caliber, and was selected by mandatory representation. Two All-Stars eliminates the 
mandatory requirement, which can be interpreted to mean that a team with two or more 
All-Stars truly has two of the best players in baseball.  
Without two All-Star caliber players, it seems very unlikely that a team can 
compete. However, it is difficult to even pinpoint who will be among the best in the 
league from year-to-year. In analyzing the 2009 and 2010 baseball seasons, it was found 
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that 24 of the top-50 players in Wins Above Replacement value from 2009 were also 
ranked in the top-50 the following season, with only two players repeating top-ten 
performances (Evan Longoria and Albert Pujols).62 Nearly fifty percent odds are not 
encouraging, but they are not discouraging either. Furthermore, the career successes of 
many of these players were not predicted originally, as shown in the analysis of Baseball 
America’s top-100 prospects.  
While this model of analysis supports the actions of such teams as the New York 
Yankees, there is still a tremendous financial risk to signing players to long-term deals 
out of free-agency. Repeat success out of free-agency is rare, and it is a huge financial 
risk to sign players to maximum deals with the expectation that they will decline as their 
careers progress. Such tactics are inefficient for any team model, and they leave teams 
committed to a player. And in some cases teams are left with a very expensive bench 
player. However, in a sport where reaching base forty-percent of the time is considered to 
be an excellent accomplishment, perhaps these teams are in the right. Some elite 
production is better than no time of elite production. And the quickest, safest way to 
acquire elite production is to select players with a history of elite production at the Major 
League level. Prospects take time to develop, and, even then, there are no guarantees that 
they will meet their expectations. Fans are impatient. No one wants to be told to wait 
until the next season. But without the capital to invest in such players, a team has no 
choice but to play the waiting game. It may not be as glamorous or as financially 
profitable as the other side of the spectrum, but it is the method that many teams live by 
today.  
                                                 
62
 Appendix F 
Youth in MLB 61 
 
 
The state of Major League Baseball as a league today is similar to the game itself. 
Teams experience streaks both positive and negative. With the exception of a select few 
teams, the majority of teams will experience momentary success before they decline 
toward the cellar. Similarly players have their ups and downs, and, with the exception of 
a select few players, players will eventually decline from prominence. Such is the cycle 
of life as well. But in a sport where not making an out 40 percent of the time is 
considered to be excellent, reaching the playoffs three to four times in a decade cannot be 
considered a failure. For some franchises, that is all that they can hope for. These 
franchises live on hope and chance. They hope that their cheap, youth is talented enough, 
and that their potential for greatness will have a chance to compete with consistent, 
proven, well-paid veterans. It seems unfair, and it probably is. But every day we hear of 
the success of an individual beating the odds of the system and achieving greatness. 
Teams like the San Francisco Giants remind us of the American values of hard work and 
persistence, and that anything is possible. 
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Team Age FA/Team 
All-
Stars Trans/Team  Payroll  2010 Winning Pct Op. Income* Wins 
NYY      29.648 14 8 27 
      
206,333,389.00  .586 25.7 95 
BOS      29.946 9 6 43 
      
162,447,333.00  .549 -1.1 89 
ATL      27.888 11 6 24 
        
84,423,666.00  .562 22.2 91 
TEX      27.671 5 6 28 
        
55,250,544.00  .556 22.6 90 
STL      28.315 10 5 15 
        
93,540,751.00  .531 19.8 86 
LAD      29.463 12 4 42 
        
95,358,016.00  .494 32.8 80 
TBR      27.768 5 4 25 
        
71,923,471.00  .593 6.8 96 
CIN      29.156 8 4 17 
        
71,761,542.00  .562 20.1 91 
PHI      30.667 12 3 30 
      
141,928,379.00  .599 8.9 97 
DET      28.865 8 3 14 
      
122,864,928.00  .500 -29.1 81 
MIL      28.005 11 3 24 
        
81,108,278.00  .475 12.4 77 
TOR      29.882 9 3 36 
        
62,234,000.00  .525 3.6 85 
NYM      27.833 17 2 30 
      
134,422,942.00  .488 -6.2 79 
CHW      29.625 8 2 16 
      
105,530,000.00  .543 27.6 88 
LAA      29.103 8 2 14 
      
104,963,866.00  .494 11.8 80 
SFG      28.715 14 2 22 
        
98,641,333.00  .568 29.9 92 
MIN      28.294 6 2 16 
        
97,559,166.00  .580 26.5 94 
COL      28.636 9 2 15 
        84,227,000.00  .512 16.3 83 
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FLA      27.331 6 2 22 
        
57,034,719.00  .494 20.2 80 
OAK      28.235 6 2 31 
        
51,654,900.00  .500 23.2 81 
SDP      29.548 6 2 17 
        
37,799,300.00  .556 37.2 90 
CHC      29.028 12 1 17 
      
146,609,000.00  .463 23.4 75 
HOU      29.789 14 1 37 
        
92,355,500.00  .469 14.4 76 
SEA      28.735 9 1 30 
        
86,510,000.00  .377 9.9 61 
BAL      28.957 8 1 17 
        
81,612,500.00  .407 25.5 66 
KCR      29.006 8 1 30 
        
71,405,210.00  .414 10.3 67 
WSN      28.067 12 1 31 
        
61,400,000.00  .426 36.6 69 
CLE      28.057 8 1 25 
        
61,203,966.00  .426 12.1 69 
ARI      27.804 9 1 22 
        
60,718,166.00  .401 6.2 65 
PIT      26.99 8 1 34 
        
34,943,000.00  .352 24.6 57 
MLB 
Avg 28.701 9 3 25 90,592,162 .500 16.473 81 
 * in millions of dollars       
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DV: Operating Income 
 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .351a .123 .092 .064750 
2 .368b .135 .071 .065470 
3 .718c .516 .460 .049929 
4 .768d .590 .524 .046855 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
5 .771e .595 .511 .047518 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Age 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS 
d. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS, Transactions 
e. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS, Transactions, Payroll 
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DV: Operating Income 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Model 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.276 .392  -.705 .487 1 
Age .027 .014 .351 1.981 .057 
(Constant) -.316 .401  -.786 .439 
Age .029 .014 .380 2.053 .050 
2 
FA -.003 .004 -.115 -.622 .539 
(Constant) -.174 .308  -.566 .577 
Age .022 .011 .289 2.029 .053 
FA -.003 .003 -.128 -.907 .373 
3 
AS .023 .005 .624 4.519 .000 
(Constant) -.178 .289  -.617 .543 
Age .024 .010 .308 2.302 .030 
FA -.001 .003 -.054 -.391 .699 
AS .024 .005 .658 5.040 .000 
4 
Transactions -.002 .001 -.287 -2.127 .043 
(Constant) -.266 .333  -.799 .432 
Age .027 .012 .351 2.248 .034 
FA .000 .004 .007 .039 .969 
AS .026 .006 .705 4.490 .000 
Transactions -.003 .001 -.313 -2.164 .041 
5 
Payroll -2.114E-10 .000 -.119 -.554 .585 
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Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .051a .003 -.033 13.875962 
2 .058b .003 -.071 14.125706 
3 .061c .004 -.111 14.391480 
4 .070d .005 -.154 14.667931 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
5 .385e .148 -.029 13.849399 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Age 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS 
d. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS, Transactions 
e. Predictors: (Constant), Age, FA, AS, Transactions, Payroll 
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Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Model 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 39.289 84.013  .468 .644 1 
Age -.795 2.926 -.051 -.272 .788 
(Constant) 37.429 86.602  .432 .669 
Age -.689 3.077 -.044 -.224 .824 
2 
FA -.125 .914 -.027 -.137 .892 
(Constant) 36.442 88.692  .411 .685 
Age -.641 3.167 -.041 -.202 .841 
FA -.123 .931 -.027 -.132 .896 
3 
AS -.158 1.443 -.022 -.109 .914 
(Constant) 36.338 90.397  .402 .691 
Age -.603 3.235 -.039 -.186 .854 
FA -.080 .981 -.017 -.081 .936 
AS -.127 1.481 -.017 -.086 .932 
4 
Transactions -.059 .343 -.036 -.171 .866 
(Constant) -56.577 97.061  -.583 .565 
Age 2.882 3.512 .186 .821 .420 
FA 1.383 1.178 .300 1.174 .252 
AS 1.663 1.658 .228 1.003 .326 
Transactions -.278 .342 -.170 -.814 .424 
5 
Payroll -2.236E-7 .000 -.626 -2.011 .056 
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2006       
PLAYER POSITION AGE STATUS 2006 TEAM NEW TEAM YEARS DOLLARS 
Alfonso 
Soriano LF 35 Signed (A) Washington Chicago Cubs 8 $136,000,000  
Barry Zito SP 32 Signed (A) Oakland San Francisco 7 $126,000,000  
Carlos Lee LF 34 Signed (A) Texas Houston 6 $100,000,000  
Aramis 
Ramirez 3B 32 Signed (A) 
Chicago 
Cubs Chicago Cubs 5 $75,000,000  
J.D. Drew RF 35 Signed (A) LA Dodgers Boston 5 $70,000,000  
Gil Meche SP 32 Signed (B) Seattle Kansas City 5 $55,000,000  
Daisuke 
Matsuzaka SP 30 Signed Japan Boston 6 $52,000,000  
Gary 
Matthews Jr. CF 36 Signed (A) Texas LA Angels 5 $50,000,000  
Jason Schmidt SP 38 Signed (A) 
San 
Francisco LA Dodgers 3 $47,000,000  
Juan Pierre LF 33 Signed (B) 
Chicago 
Cubs LA Dodgers 5 $44,000,000  
Jeff Suppan RP 36 Signed (A) St. Louis Milwaukee 4 $42,000,000  
Ted Lilly SP 35 Signed (B) Toronto Chicago Cubs 4 $40,000,000  
Julio Lugo 2B 35 Signed LA Dodgers Boston 4 $36,000,000  
Vicente 
Padilla SP 33 Signed (B) Texas Texas 3 $33,750,000  
Miguel Batista SP 40 Signed (B) Arizona Seattle 3 $25,000,000  
Adam Eaton SP 33 Signed Texas Philadelphia 3 $24,500,000  
Mike Mussina SP 42 Signed (A) NY Yankees NY Yankees 2 $23,000,000  
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Jason Marquis SP 32 Signed St. Louis Chicago Cubs 3 $21,000,000  
Aubrey Huff 1B 34 Signed (A) Houston Baltimore 3 $20,000,000  
Kei Igawa SP 31 Signed Japan NY Yankees 5 $20,000,000  
Danys Baez RP 33 Signed (A) Atlanta Baltimore 3 $19,000,000  
Jim Edmonds CF 40 Signed (A) St. Louis St. Louis 2 $19,000,000  
Nomar 
Garciaparra 1B 37 Signed (B) LA Dodgers LA Dodgers 2 $18,500,000  
Frank Thomas DH 42 Signed (B) Oakland Toronto 2 $18,120,000  
Dave Roberts LF 38 Signed (A) San Diego San Francisco 3 $18,000,000  
Justin Speier RP 37 Signed (A) Toronto LA Angels 4 $18,000,000  
Bengie Molina C 36 Signed (A) Toronto San Francisco 3 $16,000,000  
Andy Pettitte SP 38 Signed Houston NY Yankees 1 $16,000,000  
Barry Bonds LF 46 Signed 
San 
Francisco San Francisco 1 $15,800,000  
Ray Durham 2B 39 Signed (A) 
San 
Francisco San Francisco 2 $14,000,000  
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2007       
PLAYER POSITION AGE STATUS 2007 TEAM NEW TEAM YEARS DOLLARS 
Alex 
Rodriguez 3B 35 Signed NY Yankees NY Yankees 10 $275,000,000  
Torii Hunter RF 35 Signed (A) Minnesota LA Angels 5 $90,000,000  
Aaron 
Rowand CF 33 Signed (A) Philadelphia San Francisco 5 $60,000,000  
Jorge Posada DH 39 Signed NY Yankees NY Yankees 4 $52,400,000  
Carlos Silva SP 31 Signed Minnesota Seattle 4 $48,000,000  
Francisco 
Cordero RP 35 Signed (A) Milwaukee Cincinnati 4 $46,000,000  
Mariano 
Rivera RP 41 Signed NY Yankees NY Yankees 3 $45,000,000  
Mike Lowell 1B 37 Signed Boston Boston 3 $37,500,000  
Andruw Jones CF 33 Signed Atlanta LA Dodgers 2 $36,200,000  
Jose Guillen RF 34 Signed Seattle Kansas City 3 $36,000,000  
Luis Castillo 2B 35 Signed NY Mets NY Mets 4 $25,000,000  
Scott 
Linebrink RP 34 Signed (A) Milwaukee Chicago Sox 4 $19,000,000  
Kazuo Matsui 2B 35 Signed Colorado Houston 3 $16,500,000  
Andy Pettitte SP 38 Signed NY Yankees NY Yankees 1 $16,000,000  
Geoff Jenkins RF 36 Signed Milwaukee Philadelphia 2 $13,000,000  
David Riske RP 34 Signed (B) Kansas City Milwaukee 3 $13,000,000  
Octavio Dotel RP 37 Signed Atlanta Chicago Sox 2 $11,000,000  
Eric Gagne RP 35 Signed (B) Boston Milwaukee 1 $10,000,000  
Pedro Feliz 3B 35 Signed (B) San Francisco Philadelphia 2 $8,500,000  
Tom Glavine SP 45 Signed (A) NY Mets Atlanta 1 $8,000,000  
Ron Mahay RP 39 Signed (B) Atlanta Kansas City 2 $8,000,000  
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Troy Percival RP 41 Signed (B) St. Louis Tampa Bay 2 $8,000,000  
Kenny Rogers SP 46 Signed Detroit Detroit 1 $8,000,000  
Luis Vizcaino RP 36 Signed NY Yankees Colorado 2 $7,500,000  
Yorvit 
Torrealba C 32 Signed Colorado Colorado 2 $7,250,000  
Mike 
Cameron CF 38 Signed (B) San Diego Milwaukee 1 $7,000,000  
Keith Foulke RP 38 Signed Cleveland Oakland 1 $7,000,000  
Mike Lamb 3B 35 Signed Houston Minnesota 2 $6,600,000  
Masa 
Kobayashi RP 36 Signed Japan Cleveland 2 $6,500,000  
Milton Bradley LF 33 Signed San Diego Texas 1 $5,000,000  
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2008       
PLAYER POSITION AGE STATUS 2008 TEAM NEW TEAM YEARS DOLLARS 
Mark Teixeira 1B 31 Signed (A) LA Angels NY Yankees 8 $180,000,000  
CC Sabathia SP 30 Signed (A) Milwaukee NY Yankees 7 $161,000,000  
A.J. Burnett SP 34 Signed (A) Toronto NY Yankees 5 $82,500,000  
Derek Lowe SP 37 Signed (A) LA Dodgers Atlanta 4 $60,000,000  
Ryan Dempster SP 33 Signed Chicago Cubs Chicago Cubs 4 $52,000,000  
Manny Ramirez DH 38 Signed LA Dodgers LA Dodgers 2 $45,000,000  
Francisco 
Rodriguez RP 29 Signed (A) LA Angels NY Mets 3 $37,000,000  
Oliver Perez SP 29 Signed NY Mets NY Mets 3 $36,000,000  
Raul Ibanez LF 38 Signed (A) Seattle Philadelphia 3 $31,500,000  
Milton Bradley LF 33 Signed (B) Texas Chicago Cubs 3 $30,000,000  
Rafael Furcal SS 33 Signed LA Dodgers LA Dodgers 3 $30,000,000  
Kenshin 
Kawakami SP 35 Signed Japan Atlanta 3 $23,000,000  
Kerry Wood RP 33 Signed Chicago Cubs Cleveland 2 $20,500,000  
Adam Dunn DH 31 Signed Arizona Washington 2 $20,000,000  
Edgar Renteria SS 35 Signed Detroit San Francisco 2 $18,500,000  
Casey Blake 3B 37 Signed LA Dodgers LA Dodgers 3 $17,500,000  
Brian Fuentes RP 35 Signed (A) Colorado LA Angels 2 $17,500,000  
Pat Burrell LF 34 Signed Philadelphia Tampa Bay 2 $16,000,000  
Jamie Moyer SP 48 Signed Philadelphia Philadelphia 2 $13,000,000  
Juan Rivera DH 32 Signed LA Angels LA Angels 3 $12,750,000  
Damaso Marte RP 36 Signed NY Yankees NY Yankees 3 $12,000,000  
Koji Uehara RP 36 Signed Japan Baltimore 2 $10,000,000  
Kyle Farnsworth RP 35 Signed Detroit Kansas City 2 $9,250,000  
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Nick Punto 3B 33 Signed Minnesota Minnesota 2 $8,500,000  
Jeremy Affeldt RP 31 Signed (B) Cincinnati San Francisco 2 $8,000,000  
Randy Johnson SP 47 Signed Arizona San Francisco 1 $8,000,000  
Jon Garland SP 31 Signed (B) LA Angels Arizona 1 $7,250,000  
Willy Taveras CF 29 Signed Colorado Cincinnati 2 $6,250,000  
Juan Cruz RP 32 Signed (A) Arizona Kansas City 2 $6,000,000  
Trevor Hoffman RP 43 Signed San Diego Milwaukee 1 $6,000,000  
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2009       
PLAYER POSITION AGE STATUS 2009 TEAM NEW TEAM YEARS DOLLARS 
Matt Holliday LF 31 Signed St. Louis St. Louis 7 $120,000,000  
John Lackey SP 32 Signed (A) LA Angels Boston 5 $82,500,000  
Jason Bay LF 32 Signed (A) Boston NY Mets 4 $66,000,000  
Chone Figgins 3B 33 Signed (A) LA Angels Seattle 4 $36,000,000  
Aroldis 
Chapman RP 23 Signed Cuba Cincinnati 6 $30,250,000  
Randy Wolf SP 34 Signed LA Dodgers Milwaukee 3 $29,750,000  
Placido 
Polanco 3B 35 Signed Detroit Philadelphia 3 $18,000,000  
Joel Pineiro SP 32 Signed (B) St. Louis LA Angels 2 $16,000,000  
Mike Cameron CF 38 Signed Milwaukee Boston 2 $15,500,000  
Marlon Byrd CF 33 Signed (B) Texas Chicago Cubs 3 $15,000,000  
Brandon Lyon RP 31 Signed (B) Detroit Houston 3 $15,000,000  
Jason Marquis SP 32 Signed (B) Colorado Washington 2 $15,000,000  
Jose Valverde RP 33 Signed (A) Houston Detroit 2 $14,000,000  
Marco Scutaro SS 35 Signed (A) Toronto Boston 2 $12,500,000  
Mark DeRosa LF 36 Signed (B) St. Louis San Francisco 2 $12,000,000  
Mike Gonzalez RP 32 Signed (A) Atlanta Baltimore 2 $12,000,000  
Andy Pettitte SP 38 Signed NY Yankees NY Yankees 1 $11,750,000  
Fernando 
Rodney RP 34 Signed (B) Detroit LA Angels 2 $11,000,000  
Adrian Beltre 3B 32 Signed (B) Seattle Boston 1 $10,000,000  
Ben Sheets SP 32 Signed -- Oakland 1 $10,000,000  
Johnny 
Damon DH 37 Signed NY Yankees Detroit 1 $8,000,000  
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Rafael 
Betancourt RP 35 Signed Colorado Colorado 2 $7,550,000  
John Grabow RP 32 Signed Chicago Cubs Chicago Cubs 2 $7,500,000  
Rich Harden SP 29 Signed Chicago Cubs Texas 1 $7,500,000  
LaTroy Hawkins RP 38 Signed Houston Milwaukee 2 $7,500,000  
Brad Penny SP 32 Signed San Francisco St. Louis 1 $7,500,000  
Rafael Soriano RP 31 Signed Atlanta Tampa Bay 1 $7,250,000  
Noel Arguelles SP  Signed Cuba Kansas City 5 $7,000,000  
Carl Pavano SP 35 Signed Minnesota Minnesota 1 $7,000,000  
Billy Wagner RP 39 Signed (A) Boston Atlanta 1 $7,000,000  
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** All data acquired from ESPN.com 
Average Spending in Free Agency (2006-
2010) 
*in millions of dollars 
Appendix D 
 
Baseball America Top-100 Prospects, 10 Years Later 
 
Today's Ranking Rank BA’s 2001 List  
Albert Pujols (42) 1 Josh Hamilton (51)  
Ichiro Suzuki (9) 2 Corey Patterson  
Roy Oswalt (13) 3 Josh Beckett (24)  
CC Sabathia (7) 4 Jon Rauch  
Chase Utley 5 Ben Sheets (21)  
Miguel Cabrera (91) 6 Sean Burroughs  
Carlos Zambrano 
(68) 7 CC Sabathia (4)  
Jimmy Rollins (31) 8 Ryan Anderson  
Brandon Webb 9 Ichiro Suzuki (2)  
Hanley Ramirez 10 Nick Johnson (56)  
Grady Sizemore 11 Carlos Pena (68)  
Matt Holliday 12 Vernon Wells (16)  
John Lackey 13 Roy Oswalt (3)  
Adam Dunn (33) 14 Drew Henson  
Jake Peavy (40) 15 Chin-Hui Tsao  
Vernon Wells (12) 16 Antonio Perez  
Carl Crawford (72) 17 Juan Cruz   
Ted Lilly 18 Alex Escobar  
Victor Martinez 19 Jerome Williams  
Mike Young 20 Bobby Bradley  
Ben Sheets (5) 21 R House   
Jose Reyes 22 Hee Seop Choi  
Casey Blake 23 Joe Borchard  
Josh Beckett (3) 24 Austin Kearns (53)  
Alfonso Soriano (27) 25 Chris George  
Chone Figgins 26 Donnie Bridges  
Cliff Lee 27 Alfonso Soriano (25)  
Brian Roberts 28 Matt Belisle  
Adrian Gonzalez (89) 29 Wilson Betemit  
David DeJesus 30 Kurt Ainsworth  
Travis Hafner 31 Jimmy Rollins (8)  
David Eckstein 32 Felipe Lopez  
Joe Nathan 33 Adam Dunn (14)  
Justin Morneau 34 Jose Ortiz  
Mark Ellis 35 Brad Wilkerson (84)  
Orlando Hudson 36 Joe Crede (74)  
Francisco Rodriguez 
(71) 37 Ben Christensen  
Aaron Rowand 38 Jack Cust   
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Jason Bay 39 Bud Smith  
Brandon Inge (67) 40 Jacob Peavy (15)  
Jayson Werth 41 Adam Johnson  
Adam Wainwright 
(97) 42 Albert Pujols (1)  
Lyle Overbay 43 Aubrey Huff (54)  
Shin-Soo Choo 44 Matt Ginter  
Coco Crisp 45 Wes Anderson  
Aaron Harang 46 Angelo Jimenez  
Erik Bedard 47 Brett Myers (65)  
Jhonny Peralta 48 Dee Brown  
Marcus Giles (54) 49 Tim Redding  
Marco Scutaro 50 Joe Torres  
Josh Hamilton (1) 51 Matt McClendon  
Rich Harden 52 Jason Standridge  
Austin Kearns (24) 53 Wascar Serrano  
Aubrey Huff (43) 54 Marcus Giles (49)  
Juan Uribe (94) 55 Michael Cuddyer  
Nick Johnson (10) 56 Kevin Mench  
Jack Wilson 57 Wilfredo Rodriguez  
Marlon Byrd 58 Mike Bynum  
Kelly Johnson 59 Jason Hart  
Joel Pineiro (80) 60 Tony Torcato  
Jamey Carroll 61 Dan Wright  
Aaron Cook 62 Alex Cintron  
Shane Victorino 63 Pat Strange  
Eric Byrnes 64 Brian Cole  
Brett Myers (47) 65 Jovanny Cedeno  
Jake Westbrook 66 Adrian Hernandez  
Dontrelle Willis 67 Brandon Inge (40)  
Carlos Pena (11) 68 Carlos Zambrano (7)  
Freddy Sanchez 69 Jesus Colome  
Ryan Franklin 70 Eric Munson  
Morgan Ensberg 71 
Francisco Rodriguez 
(37)  
Scot Shields 72 Carl Crawford (17)  
Scott Podsednik 73 Luis Montanez  
Joe Crede (36) 74 Dane Sardinha  
Alexis Rios 75 Abraham Nunez  
James Shields 76 Brad Baker  
Brian Fuentes 77 Dernell Stenson  
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Josh Willingham 78 Brad Baisley  
Mike Napoli 79 Mike MacDougal  
Yadier Molina 80 Joel Pineiro (60)  
Chris Young 81 Ryan Ludwick (100)  
J.J. Putz 82 Xavier Nady  
Rafael Betancourt 83 Nick Neugebauer  
Brad Wilkerson (35) 84 Justin Miller  
Franklin Gutierrez 85 Lance Niekro  
Corey Hart 86 Chin-Feng Chen  
Damaso Marte 87 Tony Blanco  
Garrett Atkins 88 Danys Baez  
Maicer Izturis 89 Adrian Gonzalez (29)  
Brian Schneider 90 David Espinosa  
Rafael Soriano 91 Miguel Cabrera (6)  
Justin Duchscherer 92 Jason Marquis  
Jose Valverde 93 Luis Rivas   
Bobby Jenks 94 Juan Uribe (55)  
Eric Hinske 95 Ramon Santiago  
Matt Thornton 96 Keith Reed  
Angel Pagan 97 Adam Wainwright (42)  
Omar Infante 98 Chris Snelling  
Hank Blalock 99 Joe Lawrence  
Ryan Ludwick (81) 100 Matt White  
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Team Age FA/Team 
All-
Stars Trans/Team  Payroll  2010 Winning Pct Op. Income* Wins 
NYY      29.648 14 8 27 
      
206,333,389.00  .586 25.7 95 
BOS      29.946 9 6 43 
      
162,447,333.00  .549 -1.1 89 
ATL      27.888 11 6 24 
        
84,423,666.00  .562 22.2 91 
TEX      27.671 5 6 28 
        
55,250,544.00  .556 22.6 90 
STL      28.315 10 5 15 
        
93,540,751.00  .531 19.8 86 
LAD      29.463 12 4 42 
        
95,358,016.00  .494 32.8 80 
TBR      27.768 5 4 25 
        
71,923,471.00  .593 6.8 96 
CIN      29.156 8 4 17 
        
71,761,542.00  .562 20.1 91 
PHI      30.667 12 3 30 
      
141,928,379.00  .599 8.9 97 
DET      28.865 8 3 14 
      
122,864,928.00  .500 -29.1 81 
MIL      28.005 11 3 24 
        
81,108,278.00  .475 12.4 77 
TOR      29.882 9 3 36 
        
62,234,000.00  .525 3.6 85 
NYM      27.833 17 2 30 
      
134,422,942.00  .488 -6.2 79 
CHW      29.625 8 2 16 
      
105,530,000.00  .543 27.6 88 
LAA      29.103 8 2 14 
      
104,963,866.00  .494 11.8 80 
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SFG      28.715 14 2 22 
        
98,641,333.00  .568 29.9 92 
MIN      28.294 6 2 16 
        
97,559,166.00  .580 26.5 94 
COL      28.636 9 2 15 
        
84,227,000.00  .512 16.3 83 
FLA      27.331 6 2 22 
        
57,034,719.00  .494 20.2 80 
OAK      28.235 6 2 31 
        
51,654,900.00  .500 23.2 81 
SDP      29.548 6 2 17 
        
37,799,300.00  .556 37.2 90 
CHC      29.028 12 1 17 
      
146,609,000.00  .463 23.4 75 
HOU      29.789 14 1 37 
        
92,355,500.00  .469 14.4 76 
SEA      28.735 9 1 30 
        
86,510,000.00  .377 9.9 61 
BAL      28.957 8 1 17 
        
81,612,500.00  .407 25.5 66 
KCR      29.006 8 1 30 
        
71,405,210.00  .414 10.3 67 
WSN      28.067 12 1 31 
        
61,400,000.00  .426 36.6 69 
CLE      28.057 8 1 25 
        
61,203,966.00  .426 12.1 69 
ARI      27.804 9 1 22 
        
60,718,166.00  .401 6.2 65 
PIT      26.99 8 1 34 
        
34,943,000.00  .352 24.6 57 
MLB 
Avg 28.701 9 3 25 90,592,162 .500 16.473 81 
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Appendix F 
Top-50 Players by Wins Above Replacement Value  
 
2009 2010 
Player Team WAR Player Team WAR 
Zack Greinke Royals 9.4 Josh Hamilton Rangers 8 
Albert Pujols Cardinals 8.7 Joey Votto Reds 7.4 
Ben Zobrist Rays 8.4 Albert Pujols Cardinals 7.3 
Justin Verlander Tigers 8.3 Ryan Zimmerman Nationals 7.2 
Tim Lincecum Giants 8.2 Cliff Lee - - - 7.1 
Joe Mauer Twins 8 Adrian Beltre Red Sox 7.1 
Chase Utley Phillies 7.7 Jose Bautista Blue Jays 6.9 
Roy Halladay Blue Jays 7.3 Evan Longoria Rays 6.9 
Evan Longoria Rays 7.3 Matt Holliday Cardinals 6.9 
Hanley Ramirez Marlins 7.1 Carl Crawford Rays 6.9 
Derek Jeter Yankees 7.1 Roy Halladay Phillies 6.6 
Prince Fielder Brewers 6.9 Troy Tulowitzki Rockies 6.4 
Felix Hernandez Mariners 6.8 Robinson Cano Yankees 6.4 
Ryan Zimmerman Nationals 6.7 Justin Verlander Tigers 6.3 
Cliff Lee - - - 6.6 Josh Johnson Marlins 6.3 
Javier Vazquez Braves 6.5 Ubaldo Jimenez Rockies 6.3 
Adrian Gonzalez Padres 6.5 Felix Hernandez Mariners 6.2 
Jon Lester Red Sox 6.3 Miguel Cabrera Tigers 6.2 
CC Sabathia Yankees 6.3 
Adam 
Wainwright Cardinals 6.1 
Chone Figgins Angels 6.1 Rickie Weeks Brewers 6.1 
Dan Haren Diamondbacks 6.1 Francisco Liriano Twins 6 
Franklin Gutierrez Mariners 6.1 Andres Torres Giants 6 
Kevin Youkilis Red Sox 5.9 Kelly Johnson Diamondbacks 6 
Adam Wainwright Cardinals 5.7 Carlos Gonzalez Rockies 6 
Carl Crawford Rays 5.7 Jered Weaver Angels 5.9 
Troy Tulowitzki Rockies 5.7 Aubrey Huff Giants 5.7 
Ubaldo Jimenez Rockies 5.7 Jon Lester Red Sox 5.6 
Chris Carpenter Cardinals 5.6 Shin-Soo Choo Indians 5.6 
Matt Holliday Cardinals* 5.6 Brett Gardner Yankees 5.4 
Josh Johnson Marlins 5.6 Brian McCann Braves 5.3 
Miguel Cabrera Tigers 5.5 Jay Bruce Reds 5.3 
Josh Beckett Red Sox 5.4 Adrian Gonzalez Padres 5.3 
Mark Teixeira Yankees 5.4 Zack Greinke Royals 5.2 
Pablo Sandoval Giants 5.3 Chase Utley Phillies 5.2 
Derrek Lee Cubs 5.2 Tim Lincecum Giants 5.1 
Matt Kemp Dodgers 5 CC Sabathia Yankees 5.1 
Shin-Soo Choo Indians 5 Stephen Drew Diamondbacks 5.1 
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Ichiro Suzuki Mariners 5 Dan Uggla Marlins 5.1 
Jason Bay Red Sox 5 Joe Mauer Twins 5.1 
Dustin Pedroia Red Sox 5 Scott Rolen Reds 5 
Ryan Braun Brewers 4.9 Jayson Werth Phillies 5 
Nyjer Morgan Nationals* 4.9 Jason Heyward Braves 5 
Jayson Werth Phillies 4.9 Angel Pagan Mets 4.9 
Jason Bartlett Rays 4.9 Daric Barton Athletics 4.9 
Joel Pineiro Cardinals 4.8 Clayton Kershaw Dodgers 4.8 
Ryan Howard Phillies 4.8 Ichiro Suzuki Mariners 4.8 
J.D. Drew Red Sox 4.8 Roy Oswalt - - - 4.7 
Ian Kinsler Rangers 4.7 Yovani Gallardo Brewers 4.6 
Justin Upton Diamondbacks 4.6 Chad Billingsley Dodgers 4.6 
Casey Blake Dodgers 4.6 Chase Headley Padres 4.6 
      
*All data obtained from 
fangraphs.com      
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